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PROLOGUE 
Many attempts have been made to present a biography of 
Clement of Alexandria from the point of view of his life and 
works. Suffice it to refer to some of such studies and to highlight 
some fundamental aspects that pertain to the interest of the scope 
of our study 1 . Although Clement of Alexandria has been called 
the father of speculative theology, later to be greatly developed by 
St Augustine and St. Thomas, the aim of our research work has 
been to elaborate the theory of knowledge that lies behind Cle-
ment's speculative thought. In a way, it could be said that we 
have aimed at grasping Clement's conception of knowledge, the 
asystematic or multisystematic nature of his writings not withstan-
ding 2. 
From Clement's own account, there is no doubt that 
Platonism was his main philosophical formation and that he went 
in great quest for knowledge and studied under several Christian 
thinkers 3. The most esteemed of these, by Clement; is Pantaenus 
the founder of the Alexandrian school whom Clement later suc-
ceeded as the head of the school. About him Clement says: 
«When I came upon the last (he was the first in power), having 
traced him out concealed in Egypt, I found rest. He, the true, the 
Sicilian bee, gathering the spoil of the flowers, of the prophetic 
and apostolic meadow, engendered in the soul of his hearers a 
deathless element of knowledge* 4 . In this regard, W. Wilson 
rightly affirms in his introductory note to the English translation 
that: «Titus Flavius Clemens, the illustrious head of the Cate-
quetical School at Alexandria at the close of the second century, 
was originally a pagan philosopher. On embracing Christianity, he 
eagerly sought the instructions of its most eminent teachers; for 
this purpose traveling extensively over Greece, Italy, Egypt, 
Palestine and other regions of the East»5. 
Among Clement's extant writings, the three major ones are 
the Protrepticus or The Exhortation to the Heathens, Paedagogus or 
The Instructor and Stromata or The Miscellanies. Of these three, the 
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Stromata is the most philosophical in content. Other works in-
clude Excerpt ex Theodoto, the Prophetic Eclogues, and Quis Dives 
Salvetur as well as fragments from the Hypotyposeis. Many of his 
others works have been lost. The issue of the relationship bet-
ween his three major works, often referred to as a trilogy, has at-
tracted a lot of attention and commentaries 6 . Osborn has 
highlighted some aspects of Clement's style and thought with par-
ticular reference to the Stromata. He rightly observes that to get 
into Clement's thought is to get into a labyrinth of thought. His 
works show an asystematic presentation of ideas expressed in sym-
bolic and enigmatic language. 
Clement's thought is generaly accepted as asystematic in view 
of the fact that he is not restricted to one previous philosophical 
system nor school. His eclectic approach to knowledge leads him 
to accept whatever has been well said by any philosophical 
school7. As a consequence of this approach to knowledge, Jewish, 
Greek and Alexandrian speculative heritage are united and employed 
by Clement for the exposition of the Christian wisdom. Hence Cle-
ment's unpreparedness to limit himself to only one system of 
thought, reflects his recognition of the universal nature of truth. 
It also shows his eclectic approach to knowledge, his appreciation 
for the truth in each philosophical school and his conviction that 
no single system could exclusively explain all he had to say. Fur-
thermore his use of symbolism, a persistent characteristic of Cle-
ment's thought, is an attempt to reflect the hidden complexity of 
the relationships between things and therefore between the ideas 
of our knowledge of them. 
Although some studies have been carried out on Clement's 
thought from philosophical, theological, and patristic points of 
view, little has been done on the theory of knowledge behind 
Clement's whole thought: his concept of Knowledge and the ap-
proach to knowledge. Our research work is therefore a contribu-
tion in this direction. Taking into account the eclectic nature of 
Clement's thought, we have a special effort to marshal and 
systematize the relevant textual evidence for what would con-
stitute Clement's gnoseological view and his theory of knowledge. 
Hence as much as possible our author has been allowed to speak 
for himself. Although Clement of Alexandria never produced a 
systematic work on gnoseology, one can grasp what would con-
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stitute his theory of knowledge from the apparently unconnected 
parts and ideas of his works. To this end we have tried to give 
abundant references in connection with the topics discussed. This 
is clearly an advantage of this study. 
In considering Clement's approach to the problem of 
knowledge it would be a wrong impression to think that Clement 
was actually concerned with the elaboration of a theory of 
knowledge for its own sake or as a philosophical method. Cle-
ment never sat down to develop systematically a theory of 
knowledge as many of the modern and contemporary 
philosophers have tended to do thus giving rise to the different 
epistemology-centered philosophical systems. In these philosophical 
systems the theory of knowledge is the foundation for further 
development as is manifested by the different critiques of the 
human understanding as the starting point of any philosophical 
speculation. 
The core of Clement's originality and merit is intimately 
connected with his use of the Hellenic philosophical ideas to con-
vey a harmonious synthesis of a true philosophy. This has been 
rightly expressed by E.F. Osborn when he affirms that, «to be in-
troduced to Clement of Alexandria is to be asked a riddle. Here 
is a man whose thought is scattered and eclectic but whose 
answers to philosophical questions are illuminating and to the 
point. The answer to the riddle is that Clement is at once break-
ing up old systems and creating a new synthesis»8. Consequently 
in whatever may constitute Clement's theory of knowledge it is 
no surprise that he employs notions and terminologies belonging 
to the philosophical schools before him. Hence many ideas taken 
from Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and neo-Platonists are frequently 
to be found in Clement's notion of knowledge as we are to see 
from the many references that Clement makes to these different 
philosophical systems. 
At the core of Clement's thought as a philosopher, as a 
Christian or as a gnostic, lies an authentic and original view of 
knowledge which is reflected in the expression of his ideas. As 
would be expected, references to his works would reflect both 
philosophical and theological aspects as well as aspects deriving 
from the cultural milieu in which Clement developed his thought. 
This fact is nothing rather than a consequence of the nature of 
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Clement's thought. Hence the christian truth is an essential ele-
ment in his conception of knowledge, as expressed by his works. 
In view of the aspects that we have highlighted so far in 
this prologue, our research work has involved the search for 
related ideas in reference to the theory of knowledge behind our 
author's thought. This is better appreciated when it is borne in 
mind that Clement puts down in writing the ideas that come to 
his mind when they do and consequently related ideas are to be 
found scattered in different parts of his writings. 
From the vast range of topics dealt with by Clement, we 
have focused on the most fundamental themes of his thought 
which most readily reflect his theory of knowledge and his ap-
proach to knowledge. These themes include: 1) Clement's theory 
of the Logos as a metaphysical and a gnoseological principle. 2) 
The acts of the intellect in the process of knowledge. 3) The role 
of belief in the act of knowledge. 4) Contemplation. 5) Clement's 
conception of wisdom. 
Through the discussion of these topics we tried to present 
the constitutive ideas of Clement's gnoseology with the aim of 
providing a better understanding of his theory of knowledge. We 
have also strived to see to what extent the fundamental aspects of 
the theory of knowledge of the main Greek thinkers later to be 
found in such great christain thinkers as St. Augustine and St. 
Thomas Aquinas are already present in Clement of Alexandria. 
The first chapter of our study deals with Clement's idea of 
the Logos. According to Clement the Logos is a metaphysical and 
a gnoseological principle. The divine Logos is considered as the 
model of the human spiritual intellect possessed by all men as the 
ordinary faculty of knowledge. Clement also maintains that man 
counts with an additional principle of knowledge - the divine in-
spiration through the Logos. Thus natural intellectual apprehension 
as well as supernatural inspiration and revelation are indispensable 
elements in Clement's theory of knowledge 
Furthermore chapter II will also deal with some essential 
aspects of Clement's logic and his evaluation of the language-
concepts-reality relationship. In this context Clement emphasizes 
the need for rigorous definition and distinguishes between 
demonstration, syllogism, analysis and rhetoric. He criticizes 
suspension of judgement and philosophical scepticism while he 
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upholds the utility of true dialectics. Clement's theory of symbolism 
will also be considered in this chapter. This would enable us to 
appreciate why he is of the view that reality is complex and so 
is our knowledge of it. Consequently the most sublime truths are 
not immediately apprehended by the intellect but being hidden 
they are grasped through symbols. 
Clement attributes very important roles to the will and in-
tellect in his conception of knowledge. Clement's conception of 
the voluntary nature of knowledge is seen in his theory of pistis 
in which he intends to develop a doctrine of belief. The general 
thesis is that (from the point of view of its cause) knowledge is 
a voluntary act and consequently one would not know if one 
does not will to know or if one is sceptical about all truth. 
Chapter III, titled Belief, deals with Clement's theory of 
pistis. The aim is to see what role Clement attributes to the will 
in human knowledge and the corresponding priorities of the in-
tellect and the will in this regard. Clement's theory of belief 
which is of Stoic origin has many incorporated Aristotelican and 
Christian elements of knowledge and truth. He considers 
knowledge as a voluntary act and the question has been put for-
ward as to whether Clement could be accused of intellectual 
voluntarism. 
In chapter IV Clement's notion of contemplation as intellec-
tual vision and the object of contemplation are dealt with. He 
stresses the fact that intellectual and moral separation from matter 
are necessary for perfect contemplation. The idea of perfect 
knowledge as contemplation is treated by Clement in knowledge 
of God. The imperfect knowledge of God through the contempla-
tion of the universe when perfected culminates in the direct con-
templation of God, the most sublime object of knowledge. 
One of the fundamental ideas that runs through Clement's 
conception of knowledge is that of analogy. This is very much 
linked with his notion of contemplation. Mirror imagery and the 
idea of reflection in contemplation form part of Clement's 
paradigm of knowledge. 
Clement's notion of wisdom transcends mere natural human 
wisdom or practical knowledge. His concept of wisdom comprises 
philosophical, theological and the Christian gnosis. Wisdom ought 
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to lead to the possession of the eternal and unchangeable habit of 
contemplation which is at the same time operative on to complete 
perfection. 
The last chapter deals with Clement's conception of wisdom 
which comprises the knowledge of things both human and divine. 
Philosophical and Christian truths, gnosis and the ultimate direct 
contemplation of God are considered by Clement as a continuous 
and related gradation of wisdom. Among other topics, the discus-
sion in this chapter wi l l center on Clement 's notion of 
philosophy as a gnoseological instrument of divine Providence in 
history. As regards philosophical wisdom, Clement conception of 
philosophy as a divine gnoseological instrument in history is quite 
original. Clement's concept of the true philosophy is unques-
tionably eclectic. At the core of Clement's eclecticism is his view 
that truth is one and universal. 
Style of Quotations 
J . J . Sanguineti has already presented some aspects on the 
manuscripts, editions and translations of Clement's works 9 . We 
therefore only wish to give some additional information on the 
translations and editions of Clement's works from the books con-
sulted. (See the Appendix of the present study). 
For quotations from the writings of Clement the texts used 
include: 
W. Wilson, Clement of Alexandria (Prot., Paed., Str., and 
Fragments) English transl., in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, American 
Reprint of the Edinburgh Edition, Vol. II, Eerdmans, Michigan 
1983. 
Alieto Pieri, Clemente Alessandrino, Protreptico ai Greci, Edi-
zione Paoline, Ancona 1966. 
Giovanni Pini, Clemente Alessandrino, Stromati, Note di Vera 
Filosofia, Introd., trad, e note, Edizione Paoline, Milano 1985. 
The numbering in the Stahlin-Friichtel text has been used to 
correlate the numbering in the quotations. The quotations from Stro-
mata Bk. VIII are mainly from the English translation mentioned 
above owing to the impossibility of obtaining other editions. 
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Before going further to consider the topics that we have 
outlined above, we should mention the way in which the 
references to Clement's works have been made. 
Prot. VI, 67: refers to the Protrepticus, Chapter VI, paragraph 
67 (Edizione Paoline). 
References to the Paedagogus and to the Stromata comprise 
of four numbers. The first two roman numerals refer to the book 
and the corresponding chapter respectively. 
Paed. I.VI, 36.6: refers to the Paedagogus., Book I, Chapter 
VI, paragraph 36.6 (Stahlin-Friichtel divisions as presented in the 
Italian Translations mentioned above by Edizione Paoline) 
Str. VII.XII, 71.3: refers to the Stromata, Book VII, Chapter 
XII, paragraph 71.3 (Cfr. the reference to the Paedagogus) 
In the present excerptum we have limited ourselves to 
highlighting the main constitutive aspects of Clement's theory of 
knowledge to be found especially in chapters II and III of the 
thesis, viz. the roles of the intellect and the will in our author's 
theory of knowledge. Becasuse of the limited scope of the present 
work we have therefore left out some parts of the above two 
chapters as well as prescinded completely of the contents of 
chapters I, IV and V of the main study. The aspects that have 
been left out are nevertheless necessary for a complete understan-
ding of the theory of knowledge in Clement's thought. 
I wish to use this opportunity to thank all those who in 
one way or another have contributed to the accomplishment of 
this work. My special thanks to D. Juan José Sanguineti for his 
timely suggestions and advice during the elaboration of the thesis, 
as well as for his taking pains to read and correct the typescripts. 
My gratitude to D. José Angel Garcia Cuadrado, Josemaria 
Pastor and José Maria Valero for their technical assistance without 
which it would have been more arduous to complete this work. 
NOTES 
1. For some ideas on Clement's biography cfr. Eusebio, Hist. Eccl. VI, 11.6 
and 14.9 who presents quite a good amount of information on Clement; 
Giovanni Pini, Clemente Alessandrino Stromati Note di Vera Filosofia, In-
trod. trad, e note, Edizione Paoline Milano 1985, pp. 9-10; R. B. Tollinton, 
Clement of Alexandria, London 1914; G Lazzati, Introduzione allo Studio 
di Clemente Alessandrino, Milano 1939; J . Patrick, Clement of Alexandria 
(Edinburgh, 1914) pp. 65 and 106-7; R.P. Casey, Clement of Alexandria and 
the Beginning of Christian Platonism; «Harvard Theological Review» 18, 
1925, pp. 139-41, who rightly stresses the role which Philo played in the 
formation of Christian Platonism (p. 45). 
2. Clement's thought represents an effort to give a philosophical vision of 
Christianity using the philosophical systems of his time. 
3. Cfr.Str. I.I, 11.1; II.II, 8. 
4. Str. I.I, 11.2-3. The above passage hints at Pantaenus' eclectic approach to 
knowledge which no doubt must have influenced Clement. 
5. W. Wilson, Clement of Alexandria English transí., in The Ante-Nicene 
Fathers, American Reprint of the Edinburgh Edition, Vol. II, EERDMANS 
Michigan 1983, p. 166. 
6. Cfr. for instance, G. Lazzati, Introduzione allo Studio di Clemente Alessan-
drino, Milano 1939, pp. 1-35; C. Mondésert, in his introduction to the 
Stronzata Bk. I, «Source Chrét», Paris 1951 pp. Uff.; E. Osborn, The 
Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria, Cambridge 1957, pp. l-12ff. 
7. It is important to point out here that this good eclectic attitude found in 
Clement, is also characteristic of the great Christian thinkers as exemplified 
by St. Thomas Aquinas' synthesis. Hence one of the motives for studying 
Clement's gnoseological aspects. 
8. E.F. Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria, Cambridge, 1957, p. 
13. 
9. Cfr. J . J . Sanguined, La Paideia Cristiana de Clemente de Alejandría, Diss., 
Rome 1968, pp. 5-25. 
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THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 
IN CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 
An approach to understanding the theory of knowledge 
embedded in Clement's thought is a general consideration of his 
approach to the problem of human knowledge. To this end a search 
in Clement's thought for his ideas on man's capacity to acquire 
true knowledge of the reality, the roles of a sense perception, the 
intellect and the will in the act of knowledge would no doubt throw 
much light on his theory of knowledge. This would also show Cle-
ment as a realist philosopher, his platonic philosophical inclination 
notwithstanding. 
I. T H E A C T S O F THE INTELLECT A N D ITS OBJECTS 
In this section we wish to deal with some general considera-
tions connected with Clement's theory of knowledge. What is 
really Clement's approach to the problem of knowledge? Accor-
ding to Clement can man acquire true knowledge of reality and 
how is this possible? What are the roles of sense perception, the 
intellect and the will in the act of knowledge? Answers to the 
above and other related questions will no doubt throw light on 
Clement's theory of knowledge as well as show Clement as a 
realist philosopher, his platonic philosophical inclination not-
withstanding. There are many Aristotelican elements of knowledge 
in our author's gnoseological theory although Stoic influence is 
not lacking. In fact, it has been said that «Clement's approach to 
the problem of knowledge is rather Aristotelican than Stoic» 1. 
This is quite understandable when it is taken into account that 
Clement considers sensation as one of the pillars of truth 2 , and 
regards sense perception as prior to intellectual apprehension. 
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As we let Clement speak for himself, his theory of 
knowledge would gradually unfold, in answering the questions put 
forth above. It would be convenient first of all, to examine what 
notion of man Clement has and to see what roles he gives to the 
human cognitive faculties. 
A. Cognitive Powers 
1. Anthropological Aspects 
According to Clement the study of gnosis is to be preceded 
by the study of nature. This idea is evidently expressed by Cle-
ment when he affirms in the opening chapter of Stromata Bk. IV 
that «The science of nature, then, or rather observation, as con-
tained in the gnostic tradition according to the rule of the truth, 
depends on the discussion concerning cosmogony, ascending 
thence to the department of theology» 3. 
Similarly Clement says that in accordance with the deepest 
contemplation of the knowledge which proceeds from the creation 
of the world, to the renowned and venerable canon of tradition, 
the study of nature has to come first4. Thus by «setting before 
us what according to natural contemplation necessarily has to be 
treated beforehand clearing off what stands in the way of this ar-
rangement 5 , we are better prepared for the reception of the 
tradition of perfect knowledge 6. 
This way of proceeding as expressed in the above paragraph 
is transposed by Clement to his consideration of the nature of 
man and his rational faculties considering that the expression 
know thyself, for instance, «may be an injunction to the pursuit of 
knowledge* 7, and affirming that «it is not possible to know the 
parts without the essence of the whole* 8 ; he explains that «one 
must study the genesis of the universe, that thereby we may be 
able to learn the nature of man» 9 . 
Consequently Clement's view of man is very much inspired 
in the Christian notion of man. «Is not man, then rightly said «to 
have been made in the image of God?» —not in form of his [cor-
poreal] structure; (but inasmuch as God creates all things by the 
Word, ...) and the Gnostic performs good actions by the in-
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tellect» 1 0. Clement sees this likeness to God in man's spiritual 
faculty. «For conformity with the image and likeness is not meant 
of the body (for it were wrong for what is mortal to be made 
like what is immortal), but in mind and reason on which fittingly 
the Lord impressed the seal of likeness, both in respect of doing 
good and of exercising ru l e » n . However a strong Platonic in-
fluence that hints at a certain dualism in Clement's view of man, 
is not lacking. The effect of the latter is nevertheless mitigated by 
Clement's fidelity to the contents of Scripture, to which he 
always has recourse when in doubt. 
Hence in Clement's view the possessor of perfect knowledge 
is «compelled to become like his Teacher, the divine Logos... For 
the Word of God is intellectual, according as the image of mind 
is seen in man alone» 1 2. Clement sees a certain similitude bet-
ween divine nature and human nature. 
In Clement's view of man what has he to say about the soul? 
It is true that Clement, speaking about the soul, considers it as 
a more precious thing than the body 1 3 . On this subject Clement 
has recourse to Platonic psychology as well as to Scripture. Hence 
his affirmations that «souls, themselves are equal. Souls are neither 
male nor female, when they no longer marry nor are given in mar-
riage» 1 4 . This same idea leads Clement to affirm that the essence 
of the soul, being colourless, formless, and intangible, is visible only 
to God 1 5 . Clement considers God the soul's guide. That man has 
a resemblance to God is an idea that is at the core of Clement's 
confidence in man's capability to know the created reality and the 
supernatural truths. With references to revelation and other Greek 
philosophers Clement clearly maintains this idea. «Far from destitute 
of a divine idea is man, who, it is written in Genesis, partook of 
inspiration, being endowed with a purer essence than the other 
animate creatures. Hence the Pythagoreans say that intellect comes 
to man by divine providence, as Plato and Aristotle avow» 1 6 . J . 
Danielou has also pointed out this view among some of the Greek 
philosophers who considered that the soul was constituted by the 
ether of God 1 7 . 
Clement seems to commend the Platonic doctrine of the soul 
in saying that «the Platonists hold that intellect is an effluence of 
divine dispensation in the soul, and they place the soul in the 
body» 1 8. 
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As can be inferred from what has been said so far, Cle-
ment's anthropogical view is very much inspired in the Christian 
doctrine of the divine element in man, the spiritual soul. Hence 
the sense of the supernatural is a recurrent aspect of Clement's 
theory of knowledge. From Platonism he is influenced by the 
doctrine of the world of immaterial forms and from Christianity 
by the indispensible role of the divine Logos in human knowledge. 
There are however passages in Clement's reference to man 
which are not very clear. In Chapter sixteen of Stromata Bk. VI 
Clement presents a «Gnostic Exposition of the Decalogue» 1 9. In 
this allegoric exposition, Clement makes a symbolic interpretation 
of numbers, relating the number ten to man's faculties. «And 
there is a ten in man himself: the five senses, and the power of 
speech, and that of reproduction; and the eighth is the spiritual 
principle communicated at his creation, and the ninth the ruling 
faculty of the soul; and the tenth, there is the distinctive 
characteristic of the Holy Spirit, which comes to him through 
faith» 2 0. Similarly Clement considers that in addition to these ten 
human parts, «the law appears to give its injunctions to sight, and 
hearing, and smell, and touch, and taste, and to the organs subser-
vient to these, which are double — the hands and the feet. For 
such is the formation of man» 2 1 . However, ambiguity is not 
lacking in this view of man's faculties and this is seen specifically 
when Clement goes on to add, «And the soul is introduced, and 
previous to it the ruling faculty, by which we reason, not produced 
in procreation, so that without it there is made up the number 
ten, of the faculties by which all the activity of man is carried 
out» 2 2 . 
A similar ambiguity is seen in Clement's dichotomy or 
trichotomy of the soul and its functions. Among the distinctions 
made by Clement are to be found carnal or corporeal spirit, the 
ruling faculty and the faculty of reason. 
Clement is of the opinion that the rational and ruling 
power is the cause of the constitution of the living creature and 
the irrational part is also part of it. Hence, «the vital force, in 
which is comprehended the power of nutrition and growth, and 
generally of motion, is assigned to the carnal spirit, which has 
great susceptibility of motion, and passes in all directions through 
the senses and the rest of the body, and through the body is the 
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primary subject of sensation*23. This Platonic-Stoic anthropological 
doctrine of the trichotomy of the soul and its functions has also 
been pointed out by M. Spanneut 2 4. 
It is not clear if Clement's ruling faculty is the will or the 
intellect because he goes on to add: «But the power of choice, in 
which investigation, and study, and knowledge, reside, belongs to 
the ruling faculty: it is through it that man lives, and lives in a 
certain way» 2 5 . There are good reasons to say that by ruling 
faculty Clement means the will. Nevertheless be it as it may, the 
important thing is that in Clement's view the will and the in-
tellect play an indispensable and mutual role in the act of 
knowledge. 
In pointing out that man's resemblance to God corresponds 
to the spiritual aspect of man and not to the material part, Cle-
ment distinguishes between man's corporeal structure and the in-
tellectual structure. For some, not so clear, reason in his gnostic 
Exposition of the Decalogue, he relates symbolically these two 
aspects of man to the two tablets of the Decalogue. «Properly 
therefore the two tablets are also said to mean the commandments 
that were given to the twofold spirits — those communicated 
before the law to that which was created, and to the ruling facul-
ty; and the movements of the senses are both copied in the mind, 
and manifested in the activity which proceeds from the body» 2 6 . 
In conclusion it can be that Clement's anthropological stand, 
in view of his theory of knowledge, takes into account all the 
essential elements in human nature: the soul and its rational 
faculties as well as the senses. According to Clement, therefore 
knowledge is possible thanks to man's possession of the spirit in-
fused at creation, the soul, the ruling faculty and the senses. «For 
apprehension results from both combined. Again, as sensation is 
related to the world of sense, so is thought to that of in-
tellect* 2 7 . 
2. The Intellect 
Clement attaches a special role to the intellect in his theory 
of knowledge. We would be considering this point in the present 
section and later the role of the will in the act of knowledge. At 
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the same time it would be interesting to know to which of the 
the two faculties Clement attributes priority in the act of 
knowledge. 
Clement is quite clear on the point that among the living 
corporeal creatures only man possesses a spiritual soul with ra-
tional faculties and an intrinsic self-determination towards their 
objects. As regards the movement of beings towards their objects, 
he also affirms that some are moved by impulse and appearance, 
as animals; and some by transposition, as inanimate objects 2 8. 
«But the intellectual faculty being peculiar to the human soul 
ought not to be impelled similarly with the irrational animals, but 
ought to discriminate appearances, and not to be carried away by 
them» 2 9 . 
The intellect or spiritual faculty is thus a guiding faculty of 
the soul thanks to its power of judging the truth of the apprehen-
sion acquired by the other faculties. This idea is evidently implied 
by Clement, as for instance when he says: «Reason the governing 
principle, remaining unmoved and guiding the soul, is called its 
pilot» 3 0 . 
However knowledge belongs properly speaking to the ruling 
faculty and not to the senses although they both play an impor-
tant role. In this regard, «through the corporeal spirit, then, man 
perceives, desires, rejoices, is angry, is nourished, grows. It is by 
it, too, that thoughts and conceptions advance to actions. And 
when it masters the desires, the ruling faculty reigns» 3 1. 
Although Clement attributes a certain kind of knowledge to 
sense perception, he nevertheless is of the view that knowledge 
properly speaking belongs to the spiritual faculties of man. Not 
all reality is the direct object of the senses and consequently the 
human intellectual faculty can apprehend realities which are 
beyond the reach of the senses. This last aspect is clearer when 
Clement speaks of knowledge of revealed truth and the knowledge 
of God. Knowledge understood as the contemplation of reality 
and of truth is a recurrent idea in Clement's treatment of the 
gnosis 32. The fundamental role of the intellect is therefore the 
contemplation of reality 3 3 . 
Admitting that the senses contribute to the acquisition of 
knowledge, «...since also sight, and hearing, and the voice con-
tribute to truth» 3 4 , Clement firmly agrees with the Platonic doc-
T H E T H E O R Y O F K N O W L E D G E I N C L E M E N T O F A L E X A N D R I A 117 
trine that real knowledge is of the immutable and intelligible reali-
ty. Consequently, as regards truth, «it is the intellect which is the 
appropriate faculty for knowing i t» 3 5 . 
In keeping with the Platonic doctrine it is impossible that 
the immutable should assume firmness and consistency in the 
mutable. In view of this Clement considers that he who is 
perpetually changed by external occurrences and accidents, can 
never possess habit and disposition, and consequently cannot 
possess the grasp of scientific knowledge 3 6. Similarly if the ruling 
faculty were to be perpetually changing, and therefore mutable, 
the force of habit would not be maintained and consequently it 
would not possess true and unchanging knowledge 3 7. 
By identifying the intellect as the proper faculty of 
knowledge, Clement makes quite an interesting and firm criticism 
of Empiricism. «For bound in this earthly body, we apprehend 
the objects of sense by means of the body; but we grasp intellec-
tual objects by means of the logical faculty itself. But if one expects 
to apprehend all things by the senses, he has fallen far from the 
truth» iB. Here we have another crucial point of Clement's theory 
of knowledge: the senses contribute to the apprehension of the truth 
but not all truth is subject to sense perception. This idea is frequent-
ly applied by Clement when speaking about the knowledge of 
supernatural truth and the knowledge of God. «Spiritually, 
therefore, the apostle writes respecting the knowledge of God, 
«for now we see as through a glass, but then face to face» 3 9. 
According to Clement and in agreement with Plato, the ob-
jects of sense are not the only things that exist. «For great is the 
crowd that keep to the things of sense as if they were the only things 
in existence. «Cast your eyes round and see,» says Plato, «that 
none of the uninitiated listen.» Such are they who think that 
nothing else exists but what they can hold tight with their hands; 
but do not admit as in the department of existence, actions and 
processes of generation, and the whole of the unseen. For such 
are those who keep by the five senses. But the knowledge of God 
is a thing inaccessible to the ears and like organs of this kind of 
people» 4 0. 
As can be inferred from the above passage, Clement's ap-
proach to knowledge is neither empiricist nor materialistic. It is 
quite likely that Clement is under the influence of the Platonic 
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doctrine of the world of ideas. On one hand, he uses it to justify-
why all principles of knowledge are not subject to the senses and 
on the other hand, to reaffirm the immaterial nature of the act of 
knowledge. This is certainly the case with his idea of belief as a 
principle of knowledge. 
Accordingly Clement affirms: «But those who believe not as 
is to be expected, drag all down from heaven, and the region of 
the invisible, to earth, «absolutely grasping with their hands rocks 
and oaks,» according to Plato. For, clinging to all such things, 
they asseverate that, that alone exist which can be touched and 
handled, defining body and essence to be identical» 4 1. 
Clement is evidently opposed to Stoic materialism as can be 
inferred from many passages 4 2. This criticism by Clement has 
also been pointed out by Casey 4 3 . However the gift of 
understanding leads us from things of sense to intellectual objects 
and in fact to holy things 4 4 . 
As we can see so far, Clement maintains the classical scheme 
of knowledge whereby from sense perception, followed by abstrac-
tion, we attain intellectual apprehension. This idea is closely link-
ed to Clement's view of knowledge as contemplation and par-
ticularly so when he speaks of the knowledge of immaterial 
beings and of God 4 5 . 
Hence Clement's affirmation that «Through reasoning, it is 
possible to attain an intuition of God, if one attempts without 
any of the senses, by reason, to reach that which each being is 
in itself; and does not quit the sphere of being», till, rising up to 
the things which transcend it, «he apprehends by the intellect 
itself that which is the good in itself, moving in the very confines 
of the world of thought, according to Plato» 4 6 . Thus according 
to Clement the proper object of the intellect is not material. 
Consequently Clement proposes that we ought to direct the 
visual faculty of the soul aright to discover, and to clear away 
obstacles to knowledge and gnostic perfection* 7. Now this direc-
tion of the cognitive faculty implies intellecual abstraction, logical 
processes such as demonstration, dialectics and other related 
speculative operations. Before discussing these, attention should 
first of all be given to the aspect of sense experience in Clement's 
theory of knowledge. 
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3. The Role of Sense Perception 
What is really Clement's evaluation of sense perception in 
his notion of knowledge? Can Clement be regarded as an idealist 
owing to his strong Platonic inclination or is he an empiricist? 
The present study calls for a determination of our author's posi-
tion as regards one of the central ideas of a realist gnoseology, 
viz. that intellectual knowledge proceeds from sense experience. 
Clement no doubt attributes quite an important role to 
sense perception in his notion of knowledge in view of his con-
fidence in the human capacity to know the truth about reality. 
That the first data of knowledge is sense perception is pointed out 
by Clement in several passages. The following passage from Cle-
ment may serve as an orientation to enable us to hear it from 
Clement himself. «For in order, straightaway on man's entering 
existence his life begins with sensations»4 8, and furthermore, «as 
sensation is related to the world of sense, so is thought to that 
of intellect» 4 9 . However Clement explains that «apprehension 
results from both combined* 5 0. 
The indispensible nature of sense data in human knowledge 
is clearly expressed by our authour when he says, for instance: 
«Now, inasmuch as there are four things in which truth resides 
— sensation, understanding, knowledge, opinion — intellectual ap-
prehension is first in the order of nature; but in our case, and in 
relation to ourselves, sensation is first, and from sensation and 
understanding the essence of knowledge is constituted; and 
evidence is common to understanding and sensation.» In Cle-
ment's view evidence, this is a clear although not the only 
criterion of truth 5 1 . 
Hence the character of trustworthiness that Clement at-
tributes to the truth of sense knowledge despite his agreement 
with Platonism in that true knowledge can only be of the im-
mutable reality. In fact Clement does affirm that «...sensation is 
the ladder to knowledge* 5 2, since sense perception is of evident 
sensible reality. Consequently, Clement's realistic approach to 
knowledge leads him to shun sensism and empiricism as well as 
any materialist approach to knowledge. He does not consider the 
truth of sense perception as absolute. 
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However Clement explains that the primary data of revealed 
truth is not attained through sense perception but through faith. 
Hence, «faith, advancing over the pathway of the objects of sense, 
leaves opinion behind, and speeds to things free of deception, and 
reposes in the truth» 5 3 . 
He is quite aware of the unstable and deceptive possibilities 
of sense knowledge. Thus Clement goes on to say that 
«knowledge is otherwise spoken of in a twofold sense: that, com-
monly so called, which appears in all men (similarly also com-
prehension and apprehension) universally, in the act of knowledge 
of individual objects; in which not only the rational powers, but 
equal ly the irrat ional , share, which I would never term 
knowledge, inasmuch as the apprehension of things through the 
senses comes naturally» 5 4 . 
The definition of knowledge in the above passage is among 
the three general definitions of knowledge given by Clement in 
the first chapter of Stromata Bk.VI. As it has rightly been observ-
ed, this particular definition is rejected by Clement on the basis 
that it is not completely an intellectual ac t 5 5 . According to 
Osborn, Clement rejects it because it deals with sense-perceived 
objects and not solely with intellectual objects 5 6. 
The other two definitions are Platonic 5 7 and peculiarly 
Christian 5 8 respectively. According to the first of the two defini-
tions, «that which per excellence is termed knowledge is 
characterized by the intellect and reason, in the exercise of which 
we become real rational beings, applying purely to objects of 
thought, and resulting from the pure activity of the soul» 5 9 . 
The question remains as to whether Clement has only a 
negative view of sense perception or not. This does not seem to 
be the case for he does admit that «some questions demand the 
evidence of the senses, as if one were to ask whether fire be 
warm or snow white and some admonition and rebuke, as Aristo-
tle says: as the question if you ought to honour your parents* 6 0. 
This idea is similarly expressed by Aristotle 6 1, Xenon 6 2 and is 
also to be found in Scripture (Cfr. Ex.20,12) in which Clement 
constantly seeks justification of the highest authority for his ideas. 
As if seeking more support Clement goes on to point out that 
«Theophrastus says that sensation is the root of faith for from 
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it the rudimentary principles tend to the reason that is in us, and 
the understanding*6 3. 
Thus for Clement «sensation for objects of sense, reason for 
speech... and the mind for intellectual objects» 6 4, constitute three 
fundamental elements of truth and therefore criteria for the judge-
ment of knowledge. 6 5. 
According to Clement, therefore, the senses are to be developed 
by exercising them in order to aid the act of knowledge just as 
those who are occupied in instruction train the sensibility. Prac-
tice consequently will increase the sense appreciation which has 
knowledge for its end 6 6 . 
Nevertheless since knowledge is properly said of the immutable 
reality, «access to the immutable is obtained by a truly immutable 
means» 6 7. Hence Clement's affirmation that we receive «a firm 
persuasion of true perception, through the knowledge of things com-
prehended by the intellect» 6 8. Similarly in reference to the human 
faculties and intellectual knowledge, Clement affirms that «there are 
body and soul, the five senses, speech, the power of reproduction, 
the intellect or the spiritual faculty or whatever you choose to call 
it. And we must in a word, ascending above all the others, stop 
at the intellect» 6 9. 
In conclusion it must be said Clement attaches an indispen-
sable role to sense perception in human knowwledge. It provides 
the first data of knowledge for the intellect thus serving as the 
ladder to intellectual apprehension. All human knowledge starts 
from some sense perception and advances by progressive abstrac-
tion from matter but always refers to reality. 
4. Abstraction and Object of the Intellect 
One of the central ideas that runs through Clement's 
gnoseology, is that of the need for abstraction from matter and 
from the passions in order to acquire perfect knowledge. In his 
notion of abstraction there are mainly aspects of Stoic, Platonic, 
and Aristotelican doctrines, synthesized under the guidance of his 
Christian doctrine. 
Moreover Clement's concept of knowledge implies practical 
consequences in reference to the acquisition of a perfect moral 
life. «For he who neither employs his eyes in the exercise of 
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thought, nor draws from his other senses, but with pure intellect 
itself applies to the objects, practices the true philosophy. This is, 
then, the import of the silence of five years prescribed by 
Pythagoras, which he enjoined on his disciples; that abstracting 
themselves from the objects of sense, they may with the mind 
alone contemplate the Deity» 7 0 . 
Hence Clement's notion of abstraction extends not only to 
the intellectual faculty but to the knowing subject (man). His idea 
of abstraction therefore implies a general separation from matter in 
order to facilitate intellectual knowledge. Just as in the great 
mysteries, in which learning is abandoned for the contemplation 
and the immediate apprehension of reality, so also is purification 
and instruction necessary for perfect knowledge. 
The most outstanding text, worth quoting in full, where Cle-
ment speaks about abstraction appears in Str. V.XI. «We shall unders-
tand the mode of purification by confession, and that of contempla-
tion by analysis, advancing by analysis to the first notion, beginning 
with the properties that are underlying it; abstracting from the body 
its physical properties, taking away the dimension of depth, then 
that of breadth, and then that of length. For the point which re-
mains is a unit, so to speak, having a position; from which if we 
abstract position, there is the conception of unity. If then, abstrac-
ting all that belongs to bodies and things called incorporeal...» 7 1. 
From this notion of abstraction it is evident that according 
to Clement just as for Aristotle the intellect through abstraction 
apprehends the intelligible aspects of particular things. Clement's 
reference to the point in the above text corresponds to the 
Aristotelian definition of a point 7 2 , and the description of 
abstraction can be found in the Platonic tradition 7 3. 
Clement's analysis begins with the unit of the sensible 
phenomenon abstracting from it all the physical attributes peculiar 
to its nature, including the dimensions. When position, the only 
attribute of the resulting geometric point, is abstracted, the last 
vestige of material content disappears. The result is an absolute 
simple unity. 
In this regard R. P. Casey has rightly observed that for Cle-
ment, «Such a unity is achieved by the gnostic when in con-
templation he has stripped his soul of all its material interests, 
abandoning sensation and acquiring that impassibility...» 7 4. 
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Thus in Clement's notion of abstraction, both the intellec-
tual and moral aspects of knowledge are intimately linked. The 
category of ethics and knowledge come together 7 5, with the in-
clusion of the Stoic ideal of impassivity in Clement's theory of 
knowledge. Accordingly, to the extent that one is free from the 
passions, to that extent is one apt to apprehend the higher forms 
of reality and consequently a more perfect knowledge. 
Reference has been made to the fact that Clement's notion 
of abstraction is a manifestation of the general tendency of the 
Alexandrian school to see the passions in a gnoseological context. 
This tendency implies that indulging the flesh is a crime against 
one's ability to know rather against some moral code» 7 6. Hence 
Clement affirms that as regards the knowledge of the divine, 
«many are the ditches of lust which impede us, and the pits of 
wrath and anger which must be over-leaped, and all the machina-
tions we must avoid of those who plot against us, who would no 
longer see the knowledge of God through a glass» 7 7. 
It can be said that, unlike in Aristotle, Clement's notion of 
abstraction has a greater extension and places greater emphasis on 
separation from matter and from the passions in general. In 
Aristotle's view, abstraction refers particularly to the intellectual 
separation and possession of the forms from sensible reality. Con-
sequently in Clement's view, separation from the sensible things, 
particularly from the body, is the only way to achieve the con-
templation of the intelligible world which is the object of the in-
tellect 7 8. 
Hence the passage quoted by Clement in the opening 
paragraph of Str. IV.XXV, «Happy he who possesses the culture 
of knowledge... but contemplates the undecaying order of immor-
tal nature, how and in what way and manner it subsists. To such 
the practice of base deeds attaches not» 7 9 . The reason being that 
«the gnostic soul must be consecrated to the light, stripped of the 
integuments of matter, devoid of the frivolousness of the body 
and of all the passions, which are acquired through vain and lying 
opinions . . .» 8 0 . In this regard the divine Logos has a role to play. 
According to Clement, this role is «to lead man, the foster-child 
of this world, up to the objects of the intellect, and to the most 
essential truths by knowledge, from one world to another» 8 1. 
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Furthermore, quoting from Plato, Clement reaffirms the 
moral and gnoseological implications of his concept of abstraction. 
«Rightly then Plato says that the man who devotes himself to the 
contemplation of ideas will live as a god among men; now the in-
tellect is the place of ideas, and God is intellect» 8 2. 
In view of the infinity of the individual, particular things, 
Clement like Aristotle maintains that the objects of the intellect 
may be classed under the Aristotelian Categories. «For these are 
capable of being contemplated by the intellect. (...) immaterial 
things are capable of being apprehended by the intellect alone, by 
primary application. And of those things that are classed under 
the ten Categories, some are predicated by themselves (as the nine 
categories), and others in relation to something* 8 3. 
Primarily speaking, therefore, the object of the intellect, — the 
thing apprehended by the intellect — is not matter, «for through the 
knowledge of things comprehended by the intellect» 8 4, we receive 
a firm persuasion of true perception. 8 5 
The objects of the intellect are therefore the intelligible 
realities of the things abstracted from the sensible reality to which 
they are related as the concepts. The intellect therefore possesses 
the forms of things and through these, it possesses the things im-
materialy. Similarly this idea of abstraction from sensible things is 
also implied in what Clement has to say about perception. Accor-
dingly Clement says that perception is the knowledge of intellectual 
objects which are what the mind deals with%b. To this end, by the 
gift of understanding, one is led from the things of sense to in-
tellectual objects and from these to holy things 8 7 . 
Consequently the most perfect object of the intellect is 
therefore the knowledge of God. According to Clement, therefore, 
all knowledge and true philosophy have as their ultimate goal the 
contemplation of God by the sole pure and incorporeal applica-
tion of the intellect. 8 8. 
It is interesting to note the Platonic influence in Clement's 
notion of abstraction. There are numerous texts in which Clement 
speaks about the objects of the intellect using such terminology 
as: objects of thought, ideas, intellectual objects and world of 
thought 8 9 . Thus it is to be concluded that Clement's notion of 
abstraction, although not very sofisticatedly developed, expresses 
the essential idea that the objects of the intellect are the im-
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material forms of the sensible realites. These forms are obtained 
from the sensible things through intellectual abstraction and 
through them the intellect knows the infinity of particular things. 
Clement's operative notion of knowledge leads him to extend this 
idea to the abstraction from the passions in order to acquire 
perfect knowledge. 
II. CLEMENT'S NOTION OF LOGIC 
Clement's positive attitude to and appreciation for logic is 
evidenced by many passages of the Stromata 90. It must be 
pointed out that Clement attributes to the notion of Platonic 
dialectic the importance Aristotle attaches to logic. This would 
become clearer through the course of the discussion in this sec-
tion. Thus Clement does not make drastic distinctions between 
logic and dialectic. He considers logic as necessary for the sake of 
rejecting the deceitful opinions of the Sophists 9 1. But, above all, 
it is necessary because knowledge is directed towards intellectual 
objects and results from the exercise of the rational powers. 
Admitted Clement's appreciation of the importance of 
logical inquiry in the approach to knowledge, the question arises 
as to what is Clement's concept of logic. What essentially is logic 
according to our author? 
Clement's discussion of logical concepts is to be found main-
ly in the Stromata Bk. VIII. These ideas are used by Clement in 
the rest of his works. He affirms that scientific knowledge is based 
on general and defined principles and not on particulars which are 
infinite' 12. Hence like philosopical research which is occupied 
with conceptions and real things, logic also brings every subject be-
ing investigated under some universal principles of knowledge. In 
this way it determines or proves the truth of the point in question. 
Such is the classification of names according to the Categories 
which may apply to them in themselves or to their relationship 
with one another 9 3. 
Accordingly, logic is the art of reasoning being necessary for 
the acquisition of both logical or speculative knowledge as well as 
spiritual knowledge. This positive attitude towards logic is closely 
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linked with Clement's conviction that human knowledge is 
necessary for the understanding of supernatural knowledge. 
Before going on to discuss the logical terms expounded by 
Clement, it is important to underline the fact that according to 
Clement, for comprehensive scientific knowledge there must exist 
the right relationship between language, concept and the reality 
expressed by the language. Logic thus helps to identify what type 
of relationship there is in a proposition and consequently to what 
extent it is true. 
A. Language-Concepts-Reality 
It is generally agreed that the contents of Str. BK.VIII, 
belong to the field of logic, notwithstanding the controversies as 
to whether this book properly belongs to the Stromata or not 9 4 . 
The contents however are noted down by Clement. Osborn has 
rightly pointed out that: «These extracts show that Clement was 
interested in logic as an independent discipline. They also show 
the problems which he considered important* 9 5. The contents of 
this book are used by Clement in different parts throughout the 
other books of the Stromata. Consequently the contents of 
Stromata. BK. VIII «provide evidence of the kind of logic which 
Clement practised* 9 6. 
Through highlighting the main points of Str. VIII, we in-
tend to shed some light on Clement's concept of logic. The main 
ideas discussed are the following: the object of philosophical and 
theological inquiry, the necessity of perspicuous definition, the no-
tions of demonstration and definition, suspense of judgement, as 
well as the causes of doubt or assent, and language 9 7. 
In the eighth chapter of the eighth book of the Stromata, 
Clement deals with the distinction between names, concepts and 
things. The use of Aristotelian terminology, the realist distinction 
between the three elements of knowledge mentioned above 
(names, concepts and things) and the discussion on the ten 
categories shows the Aristotelian inclination of Clement's logic. 
This will become even more evident in the following discussion. 
The opening paragraphs of Str. VIII.VIII are very indicative 
of Clement's notion of knowledge and truth, and of language as 
THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 127 
an expression of knowledge and truth. For instance according to 
Clement: «In language there are three things: Names which are 
primarily the symbols of concepts and by consequence also of 
subject. Second, concepts, which are the likeness and impressions 
of the subjects. Hence in all the concepts are the same; in conse-
quence of the same impression being produced by the subjects in 
all. But the names are not so, on account of the difference of 
languages. And thirdly the subject-matters by which the concepts 
are impessed in us» 9 8 . 
It is interesting to note the different classification of names 
and things given by Clement in the second half of this 
chapter 9 9. He considers for instance univocal terms, as for exam-
ple animal, applied to both man and ox, because of their posse-
sion of an animate essence. Different names applied to the same 
thing are termed heteronyms whereas applied to different things 
they are different. Whereas heteronyms relate to the same subject 
under several names, as for example ascent and descent, names 
that are considered different do not possess the same subject. 
Some things have the same definition but different names 
and such names are termed polynyms. Such is the case of the 
names of the same object in different languages. Other things have 
different definitions but the same name and such names are term-
ed paronyms. To these Clement also adds the equivocal term, 
which is the name applied to things of differing definitions. Men-
tion is also made of analogical terms. 
From the above consideration of Clement's analysis of the 
possible classification of names and things an aspect of his logic 
can be glimpsed at. It can be inferred that Clement strongly holds 
the view that for there to be logical truth, the terms employed 
must really express the reality they signify (Cfr. section below on 
definition). Furthermore, since the names have their ultimate 
foundation in the reality they are meant to refer to, Clement 
points out that a logical truth is scientific in the measure in 
which it corresponds to the reality signified by it. 
As has been seen above, according to Clement, knowledge 
is, properly speaking, proper of the rational powers and therefore 
characterised by judgement and reason. These rational powers are 
therefeore directed to mental objects or concepts which have their 
foundation in reality. The adequate relationship between reality, 
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concept and language is thus necessary for them to be true 
knowledge. Hence Clement's affirmation of the importance of the 
logical inquiry in which the rational faculties act in a reasoning 
process. In this way knowledge attains truth by logical procedure, 
classifying things and concepts by reference to a system of 
thought and its conformity to external reality. 
Thus the truth of an expression or proposition depends on 
the meaning of the concept and in the ultimate analysis on the 
object it signifies. Normally the same reality produces the same 
impression in all. But, as he rightly points out, the names to ex-
press the same concept are not the same on account of the diver-
sity of languages 1 0 0. 
B. Demonstration 
This aspect of logic is one of the most important terms dis-
cussed by Clement in Str. BK.VIII and, in fact, it appears at the 
beginning of the book. For Clement the idea of demonstration is 
at the core of his account of gnoseology. The similarity between 
Clement's and Aristotle's accounts of demonstration as discourse 
has also been pointed out by Osborn. According to him, Clement's 
account, «is derived mainly from Aristotelian sources* 1 0 1. 
What, is demonstration according to Clement? «Demonstra-
tion is discourse, agreeable to reason, producing belief in points 
disputed, from points admitted* (5rr.VIII.III p. 559a). It is in-
teresting to note that according to Clement there must be some 
points of agreement for a demonstrative discourse to be possible. 
«In strict propriety, then, that is called demonstration which pro-
duces in the souls of learners scientific (knowledge) belief* 1 0 2. 
Such scientific belief is in actual fact not mere opinion but cer-
tain, scientific, knowledge. 
Clement's notion of demonstration has all the essential 
elements of classical scientific demonstration. It is maintained that 
for any scientific demonstration, the premises or initial assump-
tions must be true in order for there to be a conclusion and not 
just a mere opinion. Hence, «in every trend of reasoning, the 
point sought to be determined is the end, which is called the con-
clusion* 1 0 3. According to Clement, there is a distinction between 
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demonstration, syllogism and analysis . The distinguishing 
characteristic being that true demonstration is only possible if the 
premises correspond to, and truly express, the reality of the mat-
ter in question. Otherwise, one is dealing with mere syllogism. 
«So that there is a compound advantage of demonstration: 
from its assuming, for the proof of points in question, true 
premises, and from its drawing the conclusion that follows from 
them. If the first have no existence, but the second follow from 
the first, one has not demonstrated, but syllogised. For, to draw 
the proper conclusion from the premises, is merely to syllogise. 
But to have also each of the premises true, is not merely to have 
syllogised but also to have demonstrated»m . Thus demonstration 
implies syllogism but not vice versa since to draw the right in-
ference from the what is admitted is to syllogise, whereas to draw 
the right conclusion from what is true is to demonstrate. 
Clement distinguishes between primary and secondary 
demonstrations. The first has to do with drawing conclusions 
from what is evident. He therefore maintains that «in the case of 
all conclusions alleged to be found out, demonstration is applied 
in common, which is discourse, establishing one thing from 
another^105, the starting point been known and admitted. «And 
the foundation of all these is what is evident to sense and to the 
intellect. Accordingly the primary demonstration is composed of 
all these» 1 0 6 . 
Secondary demonstration refers to conclusions from truths 
not immediately evident. In comparison to the first, Clement says: 
«But the demonstration which, from the points already 
demonstred thereby, concludes some other point, is no less 
reliable than the former. It cannot be termed primary, because the 
conclusion is not drawn from primary principles as premises* 1 0 7. 
Clement rejects successive acts of demonstration ad in-
finitum. He rightly admits that not all things require demonstra-
tion. Certain things are evident and require no demonstration in 
order to prove the knowledge of them. On the other hand if all 
things required demonstration, then by demanding the demonstra-
tion of each demonstration, the process would go on ad infinitum 
— leading to the subversion of scientific knowledge 1 0 8 . 
Clement has recourse to the philosophers in whom he finds 
a reaffirmation of this view. This is clearly seen in the following 
1 3 0 BONIFACE N. OKAFOR 
passage: «In point of fact, the philosophers admit that the first 
principles of all things are indemonstrable. So that if there is 
demonstration at all, there is an absolute necessity that there be 
something that is self-evident, which is called primary and in-
demonstrable* 1 0 9. Three things are considered by Clement as fun-
damental grounds of demonstration. These are: things that are evi-
dent to the senses, those evident to the intellect, and Scripture. 
These three are therefore primary, indemonstrable and are the 
starting points of demonstration. 
According to Clement, «the phenomena of sensation are sim-
ple and incapable of being decompounded; but those of understan-
ding are simple, rational and primary. But those produced from 
them are compound but no less clear and reliable and having more 
to do with the reasoning faculty than the first»u°. Hence the 
phenomena produced from understanding have to do with the 
reasoning faculty which deals with agreement or disagreement bet-
ween the points understood and the reality of the points in ques-
tion. The logical process therefore belongs, properly speaking, to 
the reasoning faculty. 
As a consequence of his view of the mutual relationship bet-
ween natural speculative knowledge and the supernatural revealed 
knowledge, Clement also maintains that «all demonstration is trac-
ed up to indemonstrable faith* 1 1 1 . Thus since demonstration 
starts with axioms, Clement, with a certain ingenuity, equates 
faith to axiomatic truth. In this way the content of Scripture is 
regarded as one of the first indemonstrable principles of perfect 
knowledge or gnosis. To this end, perfect knowledge also counts 
with the help of the data of divine revelation. 
Furthermore, it is of the very essence of questions subject to 
demonstration that there must be a previously known truth, 
«which being self-evident is believed without demonstration* 1 1 2. 
This serves as the starting point in their investigation. According-
ly, Clement points out that if one starts from things that are evi-
dent to the senses or to the understanding and draws the proper 
conclusion, one truly demonstrates. But starting with premises 
which are only probable and are neither primary nor evident to 
the senses and the understanding, one cannot demonstrate. Draw-
ing the proper inference in such cases would only mean to 
syllogise 1 1 3 . 
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Now, as regards Analysis, Clement says it is the reverse of 
demonstration. Starting from the conclusion, it follows a trend of 
reasoning that goes back to the points that are self-evident. But 
demonstration is when the point in question reaches us through 
all the intermediate steps 1 1 4 . 
Clement's realist view of the essence of knowledge can fur-
ther be inferred from his idea of the steps that should be taken 
into account in a logical process. In the first place, there must be 
a univesally admitted definition of the question. Secondly, the 
premises must be true, different, relevant and related to the ques-
tion proposed. Thirdly, the right conclusion must be drawn from 
the available data. Consequently, «the man, then who practices 
demonstration, ought to give great attention to the truth, while 
he regards the terms of the premises, whether you call them ax-
ioms, or premises, or assumptions* 1 1 5 VIII.III (p.560a). From the 
foregoing, it is obvious that Clement's notion of demonstration 
contains the essential elements of the Aristotelian concept of 
demonstration. For instance, Clement affirms the necessity of first 
indemonstrable principles, the presence of at least two true and 
different premises, logical syllogism and the right conclusion. In 
expounding how Clement articulates these essential elements, it 
has been possible to have another glimpse at our author's positive 
and realist approach to knowledge. 
Thus in Clement's gnoseological theory, the extramental 
reality is always the touchstone of man's knowledge. This fact, 
together with his positive attitude to knowledge, also shows that 
his logic is not founded on pure mental constructions. This 
becomes even more evident after discussing his concepts of defini-
tion and scepticism. 
C. Rigorous Definition 
In chapter II of Str. VIII, Clement outlines the need for a 
perspicious definition in logical knowledge. «Every term therefore, 
advanced for discussion, is to be converted to an expression that 
is admitted by those that are parties in the discussion to form the 
starting point for instruction, to lead the way to the discovery of 
the points under investigation* 1 1 6. According to Clement, therefo-
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re, a rigorous definition prevents ambiguity and consolidates pre-
existing knowledge which serves as the starting point of scientific 
knowledge. In solving a problem by demonstration, a clear defini-
tion of the terms must be understood. 
Clement points out that in order not to go on ad infinitum 
in a demonstrative process or proof it is necessary for the parties 
concerned to understand the same thing by the same concept. 
«One, therefore, will give the definition of whatever he possesses 
the knowledge of; as one can by no means be acquainted with 
that which he cannot embrace and define in speech. And in con-
sequence of the ignorance of the definitions, the result is that 
many disputes and deceptions arise» 1 1 7 . To this end, the discourse 
would have to be carried back to a more generally admitted fun-
damental principle or concept in case of dispute. This is the case, 
for instance, of reducing the term in question to a concept that 
is universally understood by all of the same nation and language. 
Hence Clement's affirmation that «if the belief of a point 
that is not admitted be carried back to one admitted by all, that 
is to be made the commencement of instruction* 1 1 8. Such univer-
sal admission is based on the fact that the same concept is possess-
ed from the apprehension of the same reality. 
Clement admits that man's expression of his knowledge 
depends on the way he knows. His imperfect knowledge is also 
reflected in the imperfect expression of such knowledge. Man's 
knowledge of a thing does not exhaust the reality of the thing in 
question. Definitions therefore serve to express the precise exten-
sion of the knowledge possessed about the object known. 
Accordingly, Clement maintains that our «pre-existing 
knowledge of each object of investigation is sometimes merely of 
the essence, while its functions are unknown... or of the proper-
ties or powers, in other words of the qualities inherent in the ob-
jects. And some times we may know one or more of those 
powers or properties —as for example the desires and affections of 
the soul— and be ignorant of the essence* 1 1 9 . Similarly even 
when we know the essence and the operations we may be ig-
norant of the modifications 1 2 0 . Hence the more reason for a 
rigorous definition in the expression of scientific knowledge. 
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Clement points out that, in view of all these, it is necessary 
to specify to which of the aspects of an object our propostions 
refer, «for it is after forming conceptions of both —that is, both 
of essence and operations— in our intellect, that we proceed to the 
question* 1 2 1. It is our author's view that the form of expression 
of a certain concept may deceive, confuse and disturb the mind, 
making it difficult to discover to what category the thing belongs; 
«as for example whether the foetus is an animal* 1 2 2 . A clear 
definition precisely prevents ambiguity. «For, having the concept 
of an animal and a foetus, we inquire if it be the case that a 
foetus be an animal* 1 2 3 . 
In view of all this Clement presents some practical aspects. 
Therefore, a question must be stated in a clear and precise man-
ner; equivocal and synonymous terms being accurately defined ac-
cording to their significations. It is then to be determined if the 
proposition belongs to those points, considered in themselves or 
in relation to others, in view of what and why a thing is. A 
rigorous definition no doubt serves to solve these questions. «And 
to the consideration of these points, the knowldge of Particulars 
and Universals, and the Antecedents and the Differences and their 
divisions contribute* 1 2 4. 
With references to Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics in Str. 
VIII.IV, Clement goes on to il lustrate the importance of 
perspicuous definition using their definition of animal. «For Plato 
calls plants animals, as partaking of the third species of life alone, 
that of appetency. But Aristotle, while he thinks that plants are 
possessed of a life of vegetation and nutrition, does not consider 
it proper to call them animals; for that alone which possesses the 
other life —that of sensation— he considers warrantable to be call-
ed an animal. The Stoics do not call the power of vegetation, 
life* 1 2 5 . 
The right definition of an animal must therefore include the 
fact that it is a being that is nourished and grows as well as 
possesses sensation or movement by impulse. Consequently, he 
who admits the Aristotelian definition of an animal as an animate 
sentient being must also affirm that a foetus is an animal. 
As regards the three elements of knowledge viz. the thing, 
its concept, and the words that express it, although related, Cle-
ment does point out their difference in nature. This is quite evi-
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dent from this rather humorous passage: «Now if you are shuffl-
ing about names, it is plain to everybody that the name, foetus is 
neither an animal nor a plant, but a name, and a sound, and a 
body, and a being and anything and every thing rather than an 
animal. And if it is this that you have propounded, you are 
answered* 1 2 6. The foetus is a material being in itself whereas the 
concept and the word foetus, in themselves are incorporeal. But 
as Clement rightfully points out, the real foundation of all these 
is what is evident to the senses and to the intellect 1 2 7, which are 
likewise the foundation of scientific demonstration. 
The importance of definition is further inferred from the 
sixth chapter of Str. BK. VIII. With reference to induction, divi-
sion and definition, Clement maintains that induction aims at 
generalization and definition, whereas division aims at species, par-
ticular differences and demonstration. The result of the whole 
leads to scientific knowledge and the truth. Hence, induction, ac-
cordingly shows not what a thing is but that it is, or is not. Divi-
sion shows what it is; and, like Division, definition expresses the 
essence and what a thing is, but not if it is. Demonstration ex-
plains the three points, if it is, what it is and why it i s » 1 2 8 . 
Understood in this way demonstration is equivalent to complete 
knowledge. It is pertinent to point out that all these points are 
clearly Aristotelican. 
Clement's account of definition and series of successive divi-
sions involved is impregnated with Aristotelian terminology and 
influence. For instance, Clement explains that the definition of 
man is reached by the successive division of the genus animal into 
its component or compound species until the simple species which 
consists of man is reached. This process of analysis is then follow-
ed by synthesis. Thus, «selecting from the species, apprehended by 
division, those next to man, and combining them into one for-
mula, we state the definition of man, who is a an animal, mortal, 
terrestral, walking, rational* 1 2 9. 
In view of this concept of definition as expounded by Cle-
ment, only division of the genus into species is approved. Other 
forms of divisions such as division into parts, magnitudes, ac-
cidents are rejected. Similarly, it is maintained that in the large 
definitions of things the number of the species that are discovered 
are the ten categories. Hence Clement's view that by taking the 
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principal points of the simplest species, the essence and the nature 
of the thing is defined. For each of the species is either an essence 
(corporeal or incorporeal) or one of the other nine categories 1 3 0 
VIII.VI (p.563b), where Clement says, «For each of the species is 
either an essence; as when we say some substances are corporeal 
and some incorporeal; or how much or what relation, or where, 
or when, or doing, or suffering*. This is, no doubt, very similar 
to the Aristotelian doctrine. 
Futhermore Clement affirms that «in definition, difference is 
assumed, which in the definition, occupies the place of sign. The 
faculty of laughing, accordingly, being added to the definition of 
man, makes the whole — a rational, mortal terestrial walking, 
laughing an imal» 1 3 1 . The genus is thus in the species and 
whatever is predicated of the genus will be all predicated of the 
species but not vice versa. In all definition therefore, the first 
genus of the simplest species must assume the specific difference 
as principal and fundamental 1 3 2 Str.VIII.VI (p.563b). 
From Clement's account of definition it must be concluded 
that his account reflects a profound influence from Aristotelian 
doctrine and terminology — directly derived or otherwise. A 
definition therefore expounds the essence of a thing, for instance 
man as: a rational, laughing animal. It is however incapable of ac-
curately comprehending the complete nature of the thing. For a 
scientific definition it is necessary to divide the genus into at least 
two essentially necessary species for the sake of brevity. By means 
of uniting the principal species a definition exposes the essence of 
a thing in the qualities expressed. 
D. Judgement and Philosophical Scepticism 
Clement's criticism of philosophical scepticism in the fifth 
and seventh chapters of Stromata Bk.VIII is basically an applica-
tion of his notion of definition. The sceptical suspense refuted by 
Clement is not the mere habit of unbelief that may arise from the 
lack of knowledge or complete understanding. Clement's target is 
the a priori methodical philosophical scepticism in which the first 
principle assumed is that of the inknowability of truth. This is 
evidently a critique of the Cartesian posture of knowledge which 
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proposes methodical doubt as a principle of knowledge. The 
refutation affirmed and presented by Clement is from the Stoic 
tradition in which the main thesis is that, if nothing is certain, 
then it cannot be certain that nothing is certain. 
In particular the scepticism in question is Pyrrhonian scep-
ticism. Accordingly, «Suppose the Pyrrhonian suspense of judge-
ment, as they say, [the idea] that nothing is certain: it is plain 
that beginning with itself, it first invalidates itself» 1 3 3. 
As Clement points out, three things can be inferred from 
the affirmation of such a thesis. In the first place, it is granted 
that something is true. Secondly, such an affirmation already 
means that judgement cannot be suspended on all things. Finally, 
it is persistently affirmed that there is nothing true. There is 
evidently a contradiction because it either affirms the truth or it 
does not 1 3 4 . 
Now if the sceptical proposition that nothing is certain af-
firms the truth, then it must admit that something is true — at 
least its thesis. If, on the other hand, it is false, then it leaves true 
what it intended to demolish. «For, in so far as the scepticism 
which demolishes is proved false,... the positions which are being 
demolished are proved true; like the dream which says that all 
dreams are false. For in confuting itself, it is confirmatory of the 
others* 1 3 5 . To this end it must be said that the philosophical 
sceptical proposition is a self-defeating affirmation and can neither 
be a philosophical principle nor a logical principle. 
At the core of Clement's refutation of philosophical scep-
ticism is his defense of the knowability of truth and of extramen-
tal reality. Such truth is discovered by the rational faculties when 
man applies himself to the loving search of truth in itself through 
scientific investigation. In this regard, Clement points out that all 
that is true in Greek philosophy and in true philosophy is a clear 
manifestation of the fact that truth is knowable. It may be God 
given or obtained through the efforts of human investigation. 
Hence the mutual relationship that Clement mantains as existing 
between the best Greek philosophy and Scripture as sources of 
knowledge. 
One clear point that can be inferred from the foregoing is 
Clement's rejection of philosophical scepticism, his affirmation of 
the knowability of truth and his proposition of philosophy and 
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Scripture as complementary sources of knowledge. This is quite 
evident from the opening passage of the eighth book of the 
Stromata where he points out that the object of philosophical and 
theological inquiry is the discovery of truth 1 3 6 . 
According to Clement, the most ancient philosophers were 
not carried away to disputing and doubting, much less are the 
Christians, who are attached to the really true philosophy, and on 
whom Scripture enjoins to seek and to investigate in order to 
find. «Accordingly, by investigation, the point proposed for in-
quiry and the answer knocks at the door of truth according to 
what appears. And, on an opening being made through the 
obstacle in the process of investigation, there results scientific con-
templation. To those who thus knock, according to my view, the 
subject under investigation is opened* 1 3 7. 
On the other hand, it is the most recent of Hellenic 
philosophers who, Clement says, quibble incessantly and argue to 
no purpose except for self glorification. The barbarian philosophy, 
on the contrary, rejects all useless babbling in refuting and 
wrangling; expelling all contention. It affirms that if one seeks one 
would find, it shall be opened and it shall be given to the one 
who asks. Consequently, «when one knocks at the door of truth 
by logical inquiry, the barrier to knowledge is removed* 1 3 8 . This 
indispensible role of intellectual effort in order to acquire 
knowledge is very indicative of Clement's own practical ex-
perience and objectivity in the acquisition of knowledge. 
Thus, in the same way as by searching, examining, analys-
ing, unfolding, questioning and clarifying we find what was hid-
den, so also do we, conscious of our ignorance, attain knowledge 
when we inquire fully in a similar way. 
Clement's approach to the problem of knowledge is a com-
pletely positive one and a far cry from philosophical scepticism. 
It very much conforms to the normal human knowing experience. 
In his optimistic view he maintains that it is impossible to have 
gone through the whole investigation without receiving as a prize 
the knowledge of the point in question. 
Such is the irreconcilable position of philosophical scepticism 
that Clement rightly maintains that, drawn by the desire to 
discover the truth, we have to seek thoughtfully all the sources of 
knowledge, be they human or divine: «for it is incumbent, in ap-
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plying ourselves not only to the divine Scripures, but also to com-
mon notions, to institute investigations, the discovery ceasing at 
some useful end» 1 3 9 . 
Admitted the inacceptability of philosophical skepticism, 
Clement's criticism does not intend to maintain the knowability 
of all truth by the human intellect. Granted that the truth is 
knowable, it is also granted that the human rational faculty is 
limited, and consequently doubts, errors and corrections can and 
do arise. Now by the very act of trying to correct erroneous 
knowledge or to establish the doubt respecting it, it is granted 
that the truth is knowable. 
Hence according to Clement, in leaning towards logical con-
ceptions which have consistency with one another and with 
phenomena, there may be a certain suspension of judgement. Con-
ception is here understood as a state of and an assent of the mind 
to the apprehended truth 1 4 0 VIII.V (p.562b). 
Such a suspension of judgement, more than a principle of 
knowledge, is actually a doubt on the adequacy of the coherence 
between the elements of knowledge. These elements include the 
phenomenona, the concepts thus obtained and the assent of the 
mind to the coherence between them. 
In this regard, «not merely sceptics, but everyone who 
dogmatizes is accustomed in certain things to suspend his judge-
ment, either through want of strength of mind or want of 
clearness in the things, or equal force in the reasons* 1 4 1. Clement 
therefore identifies two causes of scepticism: the nature of the 
human mind and the nature of the external world that confronts 
it. The former refers to the instability of the human mind and 
the latter refers to the mutability, the discrepancy and the com-
plexity of sensible reality. 
He finds justification in the fact of the existence of the 
many tribunals and councils as well as the libraries full of books 
and compilations of treaties of differing dogmas, each claiming to 
know the truth. All these he sees as signs of a mind in doubt and 
not the evidence of philosophical scepticism. 
Such a mind halts its judgement through feebleness, on ac-
count of conflicting matters, and not out of essence because the 
mind is naturally open to all truth. «For being unable either to 
believe in all views, on account of their conflicting nature; or to 
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disbelieve all, because that which says that all are untrustworthy 
is included in the number of those that are so; or to believe some 
and to disbelieve others on account of the equipoise, we are led 
to scepticism*1 4 2 VIII.VII (p.564a). 
Thus Clement rejects philosophical scepticism and the 
suspension of judgement as principles of knowledge. He admits 
the possibility of doubt on the basis of the incoherence between 
propositions and the reality apprehended by the intellect. In Cle-
ment we can already find the idea that the truth is the coherence 
between the human intellect and reality; an idea later to be 
developed by St. Thomas Aquinas. Nevertheless it is the limita-
tion of the human mind the Clement considers the cause of 
logical sceptism, and not the nature of things. 
E. Dialectic 
It has been rightly pointed out that Clement's account of 
dialectic shows how in his view logical procedure is not merely 
a technique for the protection of truth but an important part of 
knowledge 1 4 3 . In fact it is speculative gymnastics as it is to be 
found in the different philosophical schools. Now what is really 
dialectics according to Clement and what is its role in the cognitive 
act? Does Clement consider dialectics of any gnoseological value? 
Among the definitions of dialectics given by Clement the 
following can be regarded as summarizing the essential aspects 
of his notion of dialectic. As in many other parts of his works 
where references are made to Plato, the same occurs here in Cle-
ment's discussion of dialectics. This is the case when Clement 
says for instance that «according to Plato in The Statesman, dialec-
tics is £ science devoted to the discovery and explanation of real 
things* 1 4 4 . 
As has been pointed by G. Pini, for Clement dialectic is 
something much more than what is expressed by the Platonic no-
tion. «He abandons the term lovgu* «with the human reason* and 
thus Christianizes the resulting Platonic dialectic, from a method 
of intellectual ascent towards the first reality, into the way leading 
to God by gradation (physical world, celestial powers, etc.)* 1 4 5 . 
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According to Clement, therefore: «The true dialectic, being 
philosophy mixed with truth, by examining things, and testing 
forces and powers, gradually ascends in relation to the most ex-
cellent essence of all and essays to go beyond to the God of the 
universe, professing not the knowledge of mortal affairs, but the 
science of things divine and heavenly; in accordance with which 
follows a suitable course of practice with respect to words and 
deeds, even in human affairs. Rightly, therefore, Scripture, in its 
desire to make us such dialecticians, exhorts us: «Be ye skillful 
money changers», «rejecting some things, but returning what is 
good» 1 4 6 . 
Clement's dialectics is an act of the intellectual faculty that 
by discerning the true and the false ascends to the most excellent 
essence of all reality in accordance with the science of things 
human and divine which is the true gnosis 1 4 7 . Consequently true 
dialectic is considered to be the science which analyses the objects 
of thought, and shows abstractly and by itself the individual 
substratum of beings, or the power of dividing things into genera, 
which descends to their most special properties, and presents each 
individual object to be contemplated simply such as it i s 1 4 8 . 
Similarly dialectics, which Clement considers as a function of the 
intellect, is regarded as the logical discussion of intellectual sub-
jects, with selection and assent. This intellectual act establishes by 
demonstration, allegations respecting truth, and demolishes the 
doubts brought forward 1 4 9 . 
Clement as well as Plato upholds the immutable nature of 
the object of truth and consequently considers the inconsistency 
and inability of a definition to stand up to the objections brought 
forward, sufficient to disqualify it. Hence the «examining» and 
«testing» mentioned in the above definition are among the most 
important elements of dialectics from a practical point of view. 
Osborn has rightly pointed out that «this testing has sometimes 
been regarded as the whole of dialectic. It is displayed elaborately 
in the Parmenides and became very popular with middle and neo-
Platonists. It is linked with analysis in the Republio 150. 
Nevertheless Clement's originality in this regard is that in 
reference to the true dialectic and the true philosophy, consistency 
is not enough. The truth with which Clement is concerned is 
ultimate, essential, Christian truth. He was certainly aware of the 
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many systems of dialectics of his day leading to different first 
principles. In his view, to determine a system, its first principle 
must be fixed. This unshakeable first principle he found in the 
Christian truth. 
Furthermore, Clement's realist notion of dialectics is clearly 
manifested in another definition he gives: «For this true dialectic 
is the science which analyses the objects of thought, and shows 
abstractly and by itself the individual substratum of existences, or 
the power of dividing things into genera, which descends to their 
most special properties, and presents each individual object to be 
contemplated simply such as it is. Wherefore, the true dialectic, 
«conducts to the true wisdom, which is the divine power which 
deals with the knowledge of entities as entities, which grasps what 
is perfect, and is freed from all passions; not without the Saviour, 
who withdraws by the divine word, the gloom of ignorance aris-
ing from evil training, which has overspread the eye of the soul 
and has given us the best faculty of all «that we may know well 
whether we are dealing with man or God» 1 5 1 . True dialectics is 
therefore intimately linked to true wisdom 1 5 2 . 
Just as in Plato 1 5 3 , dialectics is conceived by Clement as a 
rational process that has nothing to do with sense perception or 
experience. Rather, it concentrates on the hierarchical essences of 
things. Thus for Clement, the «powers» play the role that forms 
play for Plato. Through such dialectics the soul ascends to the 
forms as well as discerns the right relationship of one form with 
the others thus defining the essence of each particular thing. In 
this way dialectics shows clearly the substance of each real 
thing 1 5 4 . 
Clement's notion of dialectics is far removed from sophistry 
which he strongly criticizes in many passages of the Stromata. To 
this end, and in agreement with Plato in The Statesman he affirms 
that dialectics is to be acquired by the wise man, not for the sake 
of saying or doing what the dialecticians who occupy themselves 
in sophistry do, but to be able to say and do, as far as possible, 
what is pleasing to God 1 5 5 . Once more we can appreciate the 
very close relationship between knowledge and moral perfection 
in Clement's theory of knowledge. 
As has already been hinted above, Clement shows apprecia-
tion for dialectic. Of what use then is dialectics in Clement's 
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view? According to Clement dialectic develops argumentative skill 
which prevents one from succumbing to falsehood and to heresies 
as well as guard against sophism. Hence Clement maintains that 
«The dialectic in vogue in the schools on the other hand, is the 
exercise of a philosophy in matters of opinion, for the sake of the 
faculty of disputation. But truth is not in these at al l» 1 5 6 . 
Although Clement engages in polemics against the Sophists 
(Cfr. Str. Lin, 22-24), his condemnation of their dialectic is not 
total. The true dialectic is useful to the philosopher, to the Chris-
tian as well as to the gnostic. Hence Clement points out that it 
serves to distinguish sophistry from philosophy, mere rhetoric 
from dialectics, the other sects from the true philosophy, to 
distinguish ambiguous expressions from synonymous ones and 
above all to treat of intellectual objects by philosophising. To this 
end, «Logical disscusion, then, of intellectual subjects, with selec-
tion and assent, is called Dialectic; which establishes by 
demonstration allegations respecting the truth, and demolishes the 
doubts brought forward*157'. 
In the field of the Christian truth Clement affirms that true 
dialectic helps in the correct explanation of the Scriptures. This is 
quite evident from this passage: «For the whole Scripture is not 
in its meaning a single Myconos, (...) but those who hunt after 
the connection of the divine teaching, must approach it with the 
utmost perfection of dialectic* 1 5 8. 
Thus Clement's conception of dialectic is entirely Platonic 
and not Aristotelican although Clement's syncretism leads him to 
use Aristotelican philosophical method (logic) and Platonic dialec-
tic. Although he does not really separate logic and dialectic, he 
nevertheless highlights dialectic to a greater extent. 
III. SYMBOLIC KNOWLEDGE 
Clement's account of symbolism to be considered in this 
section is based on his view that the most profound realities and 
the truth about them, are not immediately apprehended by the in-
tellect. Being hidden, they are expressed through symbols. Sym-
bolism and the veiling of truth are thus justified by Clement on 
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the basis of the complex nature of reality, the esoteric nature of 
truth and the limitations of the human intellect. This is most evi-
dent in his treatment of supernatural and divine truths. 
Here we wish to examine Clement's theory of symbolism 
with particular reference to its characteristic aspects and founda-
tion, Clement's justification of symbolism and the role of the 
mysteries and allegorism with the view of evaluating the role of 
symbolism in his theory of knowledge. 
A. The Theory of Symbolism 
The bulk of Clement's account of Symbolism appears in Bk. 
V of the Str. although his use of symbolism is manifested in 
several parts of his writings. The foundation of Clement's account 
of symbolism is his view of the esoteric nature of reality, and 
knowledge of the truth, be it speculative or revealed. The founda-
tion of Clement's theory, therefore, has ontological, linguistic, 
cultural and moral aspects. At the core of Clement's theory of 
symbolism is his idea of the hidden things of truth and reality. 
Symbolism is thus the way of expressing and transmitting 
knowledge about these hidden aspects to others 1 5 9 . 
Clement's notion of symbolism is intimately linked to that 
of mysterion. Mystery is associated to the symbolic and allegoric 
methods of expression. Hence for instance in Str. I.I, 13.4 and in 
Str. VI.XV, 124.5 mystery and symbolism are used synonymously. 
Similarly in Str. V.IX, 58.6ff where Clement speaks about the 
Pythagorian symbolism, veiling, allegorism and symbolism are all 
put in relation with each other. The fundamental aspect of sym-
bolism, according to Clement, is that of the dissimulation of the 
truth (Cfr. Str. V.IV, 21.4), where he considers this point as a 
principle in the knowledge of the most sublime truths. Thus 
knowledge expressed in a symbolic form always veils some aspect 
of the whole truth 1 6 0 . 
According to Clement, the most important parts of truth 
are hidden. Some are unwritten but reserved for the oral instruc-
tion of a few while others are written in an obscure and 
enigmatic way and need interpretation 1 6 1. Clement sees this most 
clearly manifested in the different philosophical schools and in 
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Scripture. The Lord revealed things to the few by word of mouth 
and not in writing and what has been written about ultimate 
things is expressed in a mysterious form in riddles and parables 
and are veiled 1 6 2 . He therefore points out that in Scripture, for 
example, use is made of enigma, allegory and symbol. 
However Clement affirms that nature itself bears a natural 
symbolism, a kind of complicity between beings which links them 
all together. Despite their diversity they are all comparable 
because of a certain similarity between them. There is therefore 
analogy between things and some symbolise others. Hence the use 
of symbolism in the domain of sensation, objects, events, myths, 
language, and philosophy to express the most sublime truths 1 6 3 . 
R. Mortley has rightly explained that this view of Clement 
is due to the fact that, for Clement, «the answer is in the divine 
economy: all that exists is invested with meaning. Man and his 
world are signs because of their origin. God who is transcendent, 
has left traces of his nature in his disposition of the universe. One 
of these traces is the principle of analogy» 1 6 4 . Hence the justifica-
tion for expressing the notion of an object in reality through a 
symbol, or a spiritual truth through earthly symbolic elements. 
Things are proportional and in some way resemble each 
other. There is therefore a kind of paralellism between the 
celestial plan and the terrestial plan as well as a paralellism bet-
ween the diverse elements of the terrestial plan — a kind of 
horizontal paralellism whereby the inferior symbolises the 
superior 1 6 5 . All these relationships permit the human spiritual 
soul to make a sort of synthesis embracing all the elements of 
sensible experience. In this way the gnostic is «capable of perceiv-
ing the true and detecting the false, of discovering cor-
respondences and proportions, so as to hunt out for similarity in 
things dissimilar...» 1 6 6. 
In fact Osborn has pointed out that symbolic expression and 
interpretation is perhaps the part of Clement's thought which is 
most foreign to modern minds 1 6 7 . He has adduced two fun-
damental reasons for Clement's theory of symbolism. According 
to him, one minor point was that, particularly in Alexandria, 
Christian converts came from a background of which it was a 
normal feature. But, «the main point which underlines all the ex-
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amples is that there are connections in the world other than those 
normally seen. These connections take the form of likenesses, pro-
portions, harmonies. They all point out unities in apparent diver-
sity. They show that the world is a unity of far greater complexi-
ty than is normally seen. They give point to studies as astrono-
my* 1 6 8 . 
B. Universal Domain of Symbolism 
For Clement, the domain of symbolism is universal. He 
regards the sensible realities accessible to our sense apprehension 
as a sign of a deeper reality of which these are multiple reflec-
tions. Thus Clement considers words, objects and rites as all sub-
ject to interpretation in order to obtain the deeper truth underly-
ing them. His view of the sensible world as a reflection of truth 
is clearly Platonic 1 6 9 . 
The fundamental basis of the universality of symbolism, ac-
cording to Clement, is the fact that the whole of creation is filled 
with indications of the existence of a divine being who is the ob-
ject of a variable avalanche of names. But according to Clement, 
«... the God of the universe, who is above all speech, all concep-
tion, all thought, can never be committed to writing, being inex-
pressible even by his own power* 1 7 0 . 
It must be pointed out, however, that the extension of Cle-
ment's theory of symbolism, includes words, names and objects, 
because they all have a revealing function. They are signs of the 
reality to which they refer and which they represent as well as 
reflect. In this sense everything in nature is meaningful, so that 
even the simplest hide an immense richness of meaning, which re-
quires many symbols for its expression. Mortley has pointed out 
that, in this regard, the study of etimology, presented by Cle-
ment, indicates that the reflections of reality are discovered 
through all the languages 1 7 1. Similarly in the domain of myths, 
philosophy, language, poetry, culture, theatre and theology Cle-
ment finds elements of symbolism. This is most evident in the at-
tempts to express the divine reality which the intellect cannot ful-
ly apprehend. 
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The universality of symbolism, according to Clement, also 
extends to all forms of expression in which there is a gradation 
of relationship between the symbol and the reality symbolized. 
Hence not all symbols of a particular reality have the same im-
portance. In this regard speaking about the Egyptian hieroglyphic, 
(Str.V.IV) Clement distinguishes two kinds: one literal and the 
other symbolic. «Of the symbolic, one kind speaks literally by 
imitation, and the other writes, as it were, figuratively, and 
another is quite allegorical, using certain enigmas» 1 7 2. 
Consequently, the domain of symbols and allegory extends 
to all forms of expressions: these include imitation as in the case 
of the circle to symbolize the sun, in which case the relationship 
between the figure and what is symbolized is natural and evident. 
In the case of a metaphor which represents an abstract idea by a 
word, for instance, the relationship between the symbol and the 
reality is less natural and evident. Finally, in the allegoric — enig-
matic form of expression, the connection between the sign and 
what is signified is neither natural nor evident but arbitrary and 
conventional. The truth expressed in this form will remain obscu-
re and incomprehensible to him who does not know the key to 
the conventions. 
C. Origin of Clement's Symbolism 
The origin of Clement's symbolism comes from the oriental 
influences in Greek thought, especially in Platonism and from the 
mystery religions. To these must be added the influence of the 
allegoric method of interpretation of Scripture developed and 
employed in the Alexandrian school. Clement's symbolism is 
therefore part of the tradition that goes back to the ancient Greek 
mythical culture. Having destroyed the primacy of religious 
myths, the poets and their disciples, the philosophers were left 
with an abundance of mythical material that needed interpretation 
and explanation. 
Furthermore the origin of Clement's theory of symbolism 
must be sort of in connection with the great emphasis he lays on 
the esoteric nature of gnosis 173. To this end Clement quotes Pla-
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t o 1 7 4 in order to reaffirm his view. Hence the presence of the 
Platonic influence in Clement's symbolism. 
Similarly S. Lilla has rightly pointed out that «Clement 
glances at the most important Greek philosophical schools in 
order to prove that what he has been saying so far is right: if the 
Pythagoreans, the Platonists, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the 
Aristotelians agreed in keeping the most important of their doc-
trines hidden... is there not more reason to keep the true 
philosophy out of the reach of common people?» 1 7 S. All these 
philosophical doctrines in addition to Scripture play an important 
role in the development of Clement's theory of Symbolism 1 7 6 . 
He has sufficiently shown that the origin of Clement's symbolism 
is to be found in the practice of the above mentioned 
philosophical schools, Scripture 1 7 7 and the philosophical systems 
of Clement's t ime 1 7 8 . 
The use of Symbolism already existed in the Jewish-
Alexandrian Philosophy, Middle Platonism, Neoplatonism and 
even in the heretical Christian Gnosticism. Clement knew all 
these and in some sense tended to imitate them. Above all it is 
in Philo that the use of symbolism is particulary clear 1 7 9 . In this 
sense apart from Philo, the middle Platonic Plutarch and Albinus 
in whom there is the same tendency to stress the hidden nature 
of the highest doctrines must have influenced Clement's sym-
bolism 1 8 0 . 
The theory of symbolism had its greatest success in the 
Christian Platonism of which Clement is one of the greatest 
figures. In Clement symbolism could not stay at the margin of his 
gnoseology. The Christian Platonists were faced with the enor-
mous problem of Christian truth: the transcendental being has 
manifested himself in a sensible form. Mortley thinks that this 
problem, proper to Christianity, had stimulated Clement to 
develop a theory of symbolism, «a theory of the relation between 
the divine reality and the concepts which are presented to unders-
tand this reality» 1 8 1 . 
This idea is in fact extended by Clement to the knowledge 
of reality in general. Hence Clement's gnoseology is also sym-
bolic. Consequently syncretism and Clement's Platonic formation 
are some of the sources of Clement's theory of symbolism. 
Among the causes of Clement's theory of symbolism Osborn has 
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identified two possible causes. First, the Christian converts, par-
ticularly in Alexandria, came from «a background of which sym-
bolism was an inevitable part of their mental machinery* 1 8 2 . 
However the main point is that according to Clement, there are 
complex relationships which are not immediately evident in 
reality. 
The multiple relationships in reality, as the basis of Cle-
ment's foundation of the theory of symbolism has also been 
pointed out by Mondesert. In view of this he observes that: «At 
the basis of symbolism, as Clement understands it, there is a pro-
found idea which the very excesses of the method of interpreta-
tion emphasize... This idea is the relatedness of all things among 
themselves, the intelligible bond which sets them in order, and 
brings them together again, which makes them one beneath their 
multiplicity, one by their cohesion and their unity» 1 8 3 . 
From the possibility of finding the same ideas implanted in 
different gnoseological systems and situations, but expressed in dif-
ferent forms, Clement is led to compare and to equate as well as 
to assimilate the mythical traditions in a theory of symbolism. 
The truth is thus considered as residing in the community of 
human thought which has several symbolic manifestations1 8 4. Con-
sequently, an affirmation of a symbolic nature may not be submit-
ted to the criterion of logical truth because its truth is of a dif-
ferent genus — the symbolic. 
Thus it can be concluded that the origin of Clement's sym-
bolism derives from the influence of the mystery religions and 
that of the esoteric philosophical systems. These include especially 
Pythagorism, Platonism and Stoicism. However, the immediate 
origin of Clement's symbolism can be attributed to his literary 
dependence on Christian Platonism, in particular Philo, on Scrip-
ture and the gnostic literature. Together with all these Clement's 
syncretic method must be taken into account. 
D. Examples and Justification of Symbolism 
Clement gives numerous examples of symbolism throughout 
his writings and tries to justify the important role of symbolism 
in knowledge. In fact the symbolic style is employed by Clement 
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especially in the Stromata as he is the first to admit. «Some things 
I purposely omit, in the exercise of a wise selection ... Some 
things my treaties will hint; on some it will linger; some it will 
merely mention. It will try to speak imperceptibly, to exhibit 
secretly, and to demonstrate silently* 1 8 5. 
According to Clement, he does not wish to artfully conceal 
the truth by the body of varied erudition as contained by the 
Stromata. On the contrary he intends to avoid divulging the 
secrets of the true philosophy to those who discredit the 
truth 1 8 6 . Hence his affirmation that «The Stromata will contain 
the truth mixed up in the dogmas of philosophy, or rather 
covered over and hidden, as the edible part of the nut in the 
shell. For, in my opinion, it is fitting that the seeds of truth be 
kept for the husbandmen of faith, and no others* 1 8 7 . 
In Str. BK.V, Clement gives and explains many examples of 
symbolism using them to justify his theory of symbolism. The 
main types of symbolism include: 
a.) Verbal symbolism as for instance the Greek maxims refer-
red to by Clement. «Also the maxims of those among the Greeks 
called the wise men, in a few sayings indicate the unfolding of 
matter of great importance* 1 8 8 . Examples include the maxims, 
«Know thyself*1 8 9, the symbols attributed to Pythagoras such as, 
«the Samian counsel not to have a swallow in the house*190, and 
Don't sail on landm. 
b.) Pictoral symbolism, such as the example of the exposition 
in Str. V.VI, of the symbolic objects in the construction of the 
Tabernacle. (Cfr. Srr.V.VI, 32. Iff) 
c.) Symbolism of numbers, as for instance, the symbolism of 
The number Ten, in Clement's Gnostic exposition of the 
Decalogue. (C>.5tr.VI.XVI ,133.Iff). Similarly another Chapter is 
given to Symbolism of numbers, geometrical ratios as well as 
music. Cfr. Str. VI.XI, 84.Iff, where Clement i l lustrating 
geometrical symbolism says, «For the expression wooden squares 
indicates that the square form, producing right angles, pervades 
all, and points out security* 1 9 2. 
d.) Clement also hints at other forms of symbolism as can 
be inferred from the following passage: «All then, in a word, who 
have spoken of divine things, both Barbarians and Greeks, have 
veiled the first principles of things, and delivered the truth in 
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enigmas, and symbols, and allegories, and metaphors, and such like 
tropes» 1 9 3. 
Clement goes to a great extent in justifying the important 
role of symbolism in knowledge. The abundant reasons of 
justification can be found in many parts of his works, especially 
in the Stromata and in particular in Str. Bk.V. starting from 
chapter nine. 
The main reasons put forward can be summerized under the 
following points: 
i.) Symbolism dissimulates the truth rendering it more 
valuable and noble. Thus it stimulates and motivates the search 
for truth as well as encourages vigilance (Cfr.Str.l.ll, 21.2; VI.XV, 
126.1.) In this sense Clement considers Greek philosophy as 
dissimulating the truth. (Cfr.Str.ll.l, 3.5 ) . In Str.V.TV, Clement ac-
tually gives a long explanation of this concept of the dissimulation 
of truth. 
ii.) Symbolism, by veiling the truth, possesses a greater sug-
gestive power and consequently makes a more vivid impression on 
the mind. «Besides all things that shine through a veil show the 
truth grander and more imposing... in addition things unconcealed 
are perceived in one way» 1 9 4 . 
iii.) Clement also points out that symbolism serves for brevi-
ty of expression. «Very useful, then, is the mode of symbolic in-
terpretation for many purposes; and it is helpful to the right 
theology, and to piety, and to the display of intelligence, and the 
practice of brevity, and exhibition of wisdom» 1 9 5 . 
iv.) Apart from the fact that symbols are more impressive 
than ordinary forms of expression of the truth, they also make 
possible for a variety of interpretations. «Since, then, we may 
draw several meanings, as we do from what is expressed in veiled 
form, such being the case, the ignorant and unlearned man falls 
into error. But the gnostic apprehends* 1 9 6. 
v.) Symbolism also responds to the esoteric nature of 
knowledge. Consequently Clement affirms that all forms of 
philosophy have veiled certain knowledge in symbols and allegory. 
«And the disciples of Aristotle say that some of their treaties are 
esoteric and others common and exoteric* 1 9 7. The use of sym-
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bolism therefore responds to the reservation and prudence that 
must be practiced in the transmission of the most sublime truths. 
vi.) The existence of tradition is another justifcation for 
symbolism. Since mere verbal expressions veil a certain aspect of 
the reality signified, Clement maintains that interpreters will be 
needed. These will transmit the whole truth to others thus con-
stituting a tradition. «They also wish us to require an interpreter 
and a guide. For so they consider that receiving truth from the 
hands of those who knew it well, we would be more earnest and 
less liable to deception, and those worthy of them would 
profit* 1 9 8. 
vii.) Clement considers truth to possess a certain sacredness 
and because of its preciousness it must not be profaned by the 
morally impure. This idea is symbolically expressed by Clement 
in the following passage: «Wherefore, the method of concealment 
is truly divine and most necessarey for us, because of the truly 
sacred teaching deposited in the shrine of truth* 1 9 9 . 
In conclusion, Clement's theory of knowledge is to be con-
sidered in view of his Christian notion of man understood as en-
dowed with sense perception and intellectual apprehension. The 
latter proceeds from the former by abstraction. Although the two 
are indispensable for knowledge, only to the intellect is 
knowledge attributed properly speaking. In Clement's notion of 
knowledge the ethical and the speculative aspects are intimately 
linked. Hence his notion of abstraction from matter extends not 
only to the intellect but to the separation of the knowing subject 
from the passions in order to acquire perfect knowledge. 
Apart from abstraction, such logical acts as demonstration, 
definition, and dialectic proceedings are all attributed by Clement 
to the intellect because in them there can be pure application of 
the intellect. To this end Clement regards them as acts of the in-
tellect that result in the acquisition of truth. 
At the core of Clement's theory of knowledge is his em-
phasis on the esoteric nature of the most sublime realities and 
consequently of the knowledge about them, since the intellect is 
not perfect. This for Clement is the foundation of symbolic 
knowledge and he firmly justifies the theory of symbolism. The 
origin of his theory of symbolism can be traced back to the in-
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fluence of the Greek mysteries, Scripture and Clement 's 
dependence on the philosophical tradition of his time. 
It is worthwhile mentioning at this point that these elements 
present in Clement's thought already contain substantially com-
plete the gnoseological doctrine later to be recieved by the 
mediaeval Christ ian culture. These include Aristotel ian 
epistemological elements, aspects of the Platonic doctrine of on-
tological knowledge and the importance of symbolism that later 
exercises a great influence in speculative theology. In a word it 
could be said that in Clement the Agustinian and Thomistic pro-
gramme is already marked out. Clement is truly the first in Chris-
tian philosophical thought. 
IV. THE WILL AND THE VOLUNTARY DIMENSION OF KNOWLEDGE 
At the core of many theories of knowledge, one can find the 
doctrine of a voluntary rejection of aspects of spontaneous 
knowledge or a perculiar view of the will in knowledge. 
Having seen some fundamental aspects of the role of the 
intellect in Clement's conception of knowledge, in the previous 
section, our study now calls for a treatment of an aspect which 
in Clement's theory of knowledge is fundamental. This is the vo-
luntary factor in the act of knowledge which is treated by Cle-
ment in his theory of muxml He very much appreciates the im-
portant role of the will in knowledge in view of its positive role 
in inclining the rational faculties towards knowledge. How vo-
luntary is the act of knowledge according Clement? Does our author 
attribute priority to the intellect or to the will in the act of 
knowledge or does he rather see a simultaneous and mutual in-
fluence? As we strive to marshal out answers to these questions 
from Clement's thought, the role of the will in his theory of 
knowledge will become clearer. 
Clement is quite outspoken as regards the voluntary opera-
tion of the soul. This is most evidently manifestated when Cle-
ment speaks about the authority of the will in moral actions and 
in assent to the truth. In fact some passages give the impression 
that he overvalues the will's capacity to selfdetermination. 
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A. The Doctrine of Assent 
The importance of belief in the act of knowledge had been 
pointed out by some philosophical schools before and during Cle-
ment's time, as for instance the Stoics. In general assent can be 
considered as the act of interior adhesion to what the mind ap-
prehends as true or the personal participation in an idea or ac-
t ion 2 0 0 . 
The Stoics consider assent as the intrinsic moment of 
knowledge and recognize in it a certain role of the will, consider-
ing error as the consequence of a precipitated assent. Thus assent 
is simply seen as the act by which that which is presented as evi-
dent, is recognized as such by the influence of the will. It can 
therefore be said that the constitutive act of assent is presented as 
a theoretical and a practical moment of knowledge 2 0 1 . Later St. 
Thomas among others has however pointed out the complexity of 
the act of assent 2 0 2. 
Clement affirms the Stoic teaching on the important role of 
belief in knowledge and that assent is an act of voluntary 
choice 2 0 3 . In view of Stoic philosophy, he affirms: «And not on-
ly the Platonists, but also the Stoics, say that assent is in our own 
power. All opinion then, and judgment, and supposition, and 
knowledge, by which we live and have perpetual intercourse with 
the human race, is assent; which is nothing else than faith» 2 0 4 . 
Such is the context and extention of Clement's notion of belief. 
The importance of belief in Clement's theory of knowledge 
may be better appreciated if it is borne in mind that according to 
ideas in Aristotle and the Stoics, pistis pertains to the judgement 
of a syllogism or of a reasoning process — the faculty which ac-
cepts the result of reasoning 2 0 5 . Thus Aristotle maintains a 
similar idea Top. 1.1.100b. 18. It is in this context of pistis, as cer-
tain knowledge, a truth evident in itself, that Clement's notion of 
assent has to be placed. 
Similarly Epicurus already employed the notion of pistis, 
understood as a voluntary preconception in his theory of 
knowledge. Clement presents a long treatment of Epicurus' con-
ception in Str. II.IV, 16.3. He points out that it is a clear grasping 
of the concept of a thing, which constitutes the precondition for 
any argument, opinion or intellectual activity. In this sense belief 
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becomes the initial understanding which permits further 
understanding of a truth. Through this preconception one 
establishes general notions, as the basis, in anticipation of the con-
clusion of an intellectual discovery. Pistis can therefore be regard-
ed as a point of departure that helps to guide the progress of in-
tellectual knowledge. 
As R. Mortley observes, Clement's treatment of the notion 
of belief in knowledge shows a great originality. «He is the first, 
known to us, to adapt the scriptural term to the notion of pistis 
that is found in Aristotelian and stoic logic* 2 0 6 . 
According to Plato, belief, that is conjecture, comes under 
the category of opinion 2 0 7 . In this sense pistis is considered as 
part of inferior knowledge whose object is the changeable reality 
and therefore is not to be considered as real truth. However Cle-
ment attaches to belief the importance Aristotle attaches to the 
knowledge of the first principles. It is this tradition of the notion 
of belief which permits Clement to show the philosophical accep-
tability of faith as a fundamental aspect of knowledge 2 0 8 . Thus 
for Clement pistis is not just a mere acceptance of a vague and 
irrational opinion but the foundation and part of knowledge 2 0 9 . 
Lilla has really observed that Clement obtains this doctrine from 
Plato but that Clement uses it in addition some Aristotelican 
ideas 2 1 0 . 
According to Clement this assent of the will is of double 
importance. On the one hand it is the foundation of knowledge 
(epistemological pistis) and on the other hand it is necessary for 
salvation (religious pistis). However there is a mutual and com-
plementary connection between the two as far as knowledge is 
concerned. 
B. Clement's Theory of Pistis 
The idea of perfect knowledge represents one of the most 
important aspects of Clement's philosophy and some of his most 
instructive writing concerns the nature of pistis and gnosis. 
Although the ideas on these topics can be found throughout his 
works, the theory of pistis is discussed mainly in Stromata II and 
Stromata V. The issue of gnoseological perfection is, in Clement's 
thought, closely related to that of pistis 211. 
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Clement's doctrine of pistis can rightly be said to represent 
a serious attempt to give a scientific explanation of the words 
pistis (faith) and maxtucy (to believe) which occur so frequently in 
the Scriptures. Clement's theory of pistis concerns the nature of 
belief and may be described as the first Christian essay in aid of 
a grammar of assent 2 1 2. He also seeks to relate the act of faith 
to the epistemological debates of the philosophical schools about 
the nature of proof and the ground of assent 2 1 3 . In order to 
achieve his goal, Clement resorted to the school-philosophy of his 
time as well as to some ideas characteristic of Philo. 
Clement attaches several meanings to his conception of pistis. 
Among other meanings it pertains to the intellectual acceptance of 
evident truth. In the following section we intend to discuss some 
of the meanings of Clement's conception of pistis with the view 
obtaining a more global understanding of Clement's concept. 
Clement's definitions of pistis are closely related to one 
another and the study of each of them and their mutual relation-
ships would provide a better understanding of what Clement real-
ly means by pistis and the role it plays in his gnoseological doc-
trine. 
The most characteristic aspect of Clement's notion of the 
pistis is the stress on the idea of «a firm conviction^ that reflects 
the truth. Presently the first meaning which refers to the 
epistemological aspect of pistis will be examined followed by the 
discussion of the religious pistis. 
1. Pistis as assent to evident knowledge and to first principles 
The indispensable role of pistis in the acquisition of 
knowledge is expressed by Clement in some of his definitions of 
demonstration 2 1 4 , Pistis is presented as the intellectual act of 
assenting to immediate, evident knowledge or to the first 
undemonstrable principles of demonstration. This first meaning of 
pistis occurs in such passages as: «What is subjected to criticism is 
not believed till it is so subjected; so that what needs criticism 
cannot be a first principle. Therefore, as is reasonable, grasping by 
faith the undemonstrable first principle and receiving in abun-
dance, from the first principle itself, demonstrations in reference 
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to the first principle, we are by the voice of the Lord trained up 
to the knowledge of the truth» 2 1 5 . 
The idea on which the above passage is based is expounded 
by Clement in Str. VIII, which contains some material dealing 
mainly with logic and epistemology (Cfr. chap. II. sect. 2). This 
idea which is worth emphasizing expresses the metaphysical foun-
dation of Clement's theory of belief: «either everything needs a 
demonstration, or something is itself trustworthy. In the first case 
we, by requiring the demonstration of each demonstration, shall 
be involved in an infinite regress, and in this way the demonstra-
tion itself will be overthrown. In the second case the things 
which are themselves trustworthy will become the principles of 
demonstrations. The philosophers then admit that the principles 
of all things are undemonstrated. Consequently, if there is a 
demonstration, there must necessarily be something prior to it, 
which is trustworthy and which is called «pr imary» and 
undemonstrated. Therefore every demonstration is traced back to 
an undemonstrated belief' 216. 
According to Clement, therefore, some demonstations must 
be based on undemonstrated principles, which are themselves 
trustworthy or evident. This explains why at the end of the 
passage, he calls the first principle pistis, and maintains that by 
means of pistis it is possible to assent to the existence of some 
undemonstrable principles 2 1 7 . Similary Clement points out that 
knowledge is not founded on demonstration by a process of 
reasoning because the first principles are incapable of demonstra-
tion; for they are known neither by art nor by theory. For the 
latter is conversant about objects that are susceptible to change, 
while the former is only practical and not theoretical 2 1 8. 
«Hence it is thought that the first cause of the universe can 
be apprehended by faith alone. Since all science is capable of be-
ing taught; what is capable of being taught is founded on what 
is known before. But the first cause of the universe was not 
previously known to the Greeks» 2 1 9 . As regards the need for, 
and the existence of an absolute and unconditioned principle in 
the dialectic process, attention had been drawn by Plato and 
Arisotle. The former in the Republic, VI, 511 b 6-7 2 2 0 . Aristotle 
maintains that it is impossible to require a demonstration for 
every demonstration, and that some demonstrations must start 
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from some absolute, undemonstrated, truths, and consequently also 
trustworthy principles 221. This Aristotelian doctrine is similar to 
Clement's conception of assent. Clement's originality lies in at-
tributing to belief the quality of an undemonstrable principle of 
knowledge. 
Thus like many other Stoic and Aristotelian doctrines, the 
Aristotelian doctrine of the absolute undemonstrable and trustwor-
thy principle of demonstration had become a constitutive element 
of the syncretism characteristic of some Middle-Platonic Schools as 
well as in Clement's conception of pistis. 
Furthermore, Clement is inclined to consider as principles of 
demonstration, not only the universal and trustworthy Aristotelian 
principles, but also what appears evident both to sensation and to 
the mind 222. This idea is evidenced by Clement's affirmation Str. 
Bk. II that: «Theophrastus says that sensation is the root of pistis. 
For from it the rudimentary principles extend to the mind that 
is in us, and the understanding* 2 2 3 . Hence Clement's conception 
of gnoseological belief is not a mere blind faith but has its foun-
dation in reality. 
This consideration of what appears evident both to sensation 
and to the mind as principles of demonstration, (i.e., of scientific 
knowledge) is closely connected with the view according to which 
scientific knowledge is based on both sensations and perception 
and on the mind. This is clearly expressed in the following words: 
«Now, inasmuch as there are four things in which the truth 
resides —sensation, understanding, knowledge, opinion— intellec-
tual apprehension is first in the order of nature; but in our case, 
and in relation to ourselves, sensation is first, and of sensation 
and understanding the essence of knowledge is formed; and 
evidence is common to understanding and sensation* 2 2 4. These 
ideas are very similar to and indicative of Clement's dependence 
on the epistemology of the Peripatetic School tradition 2 2 5 . 
It must be said that Clement surpasses the doctrine of pistis 
in his predecessors. According to him, «sensation is the ladder to 
knowledge; while Faith, advancing over the pathway of the ob-
jects of sense, leaves opinion behind, and speeds to things free of 
deception, and reposes in the truth* 2 2 6 . 
Nevertheless what Clement says in Str. 23.11, 9.5; II.IV, 13.2; 
VIII.Ill, 7.3-4 and 14.3 can be said to form a coherent 
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epistemological system and in agreement with the idea that the 
self-evidence of sense-perceptions represents the first fundamental 
stage for the growth of knowledge and has a direct influence on 
intellectual apprehension 2 2 7. 
From what we have seen so far about Clement's doctrine of 
pistis, it is worthwhile mentioning that despite Philo's great in-
fluence on Clement in general, he does not possess such a com-
plicated doctrine of pistis as is to be found in Clement. However 
his epistemological views have been shown to be the similar to 
those of Antiochus. For instance, Philo maintains that knowledge 
is the product of the activity of sense-perceptions or sensations 
and the mind 2 2 8 . Nevertheless Clement received not from the 
Peripatetic school, but from the school-teaching going back to An-
tiochus, the doctrine of assent to what appears evident to sense-
perception as origin of immediate knowledge. 
Now in the next section we will examine another meaning 
of pistis as it is to be found in Clement's gnoseological views. 
2. Preconception or Intellectual Anticipation 
The idea of pistis as belief in those principles which appear 
evident both to sensation and to mind is closely related to the 
definition of pistis as assent, approval of, or consent to 
(ou^xaTaOecris) which appears in such passages as: «But the faith 
which some Greeks disparage, deeming it futile and barbarous, is 
a voluntary preconception or anticipation (npoknyic,); the assent of 
piety» 2 2 9 . 
This same idea is expressed thus: «...and a hope which is the 
future apprehension of a future event. And not only the Platonist, 
but the Stoics, say that assent is in our own power. All opinion 
then, and judgment, and supposition, and knowledge, by which we 
live and have perpetual intercourse with the human race, is an as-
sent, which is nothing else than faith» 2 3 0 . 
Clement employs the Stoic terminology au£xaTa9eai<; (to ap-
prove of) used in the middle-platonic philosophy of his time as is 
shown by the allusion made in Str. II.XII, 54.5 2 3 1 . The other ter-
minology, itpoknyic, (anticipation) and «preconception» is of 
Epicurean origin and middle-platonic origins The Stoic term, 
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epecially as used by the Stoics, indicated the positive reaction or 
assent of the mind to sense-perceptions. In this sense, assent and 
faith are practically the same 2 3 2 . However it is the mind that 
must ultimately decide whether to believe or not the sense percep-
tions and this decision is expressed by an intellectual assent. 
By using the Stoic and Epicurean terminologies, Clement ap-
proves of Epicurus' statement according to which pistis is a 
preconception of the mind: «Epicurus, too, who very greatly 
preferred pleasure to truth, supposes faith to be a preconception 
of the mind; and defines preconception to be a grasping at 
something evident, and as the clear understanding of the things; and 
asserts that without preconception, no one can either inquire, or 
doubt, or judge, or even argue» 2 3 3 . Thus the «preconception of 
the mind» in this sense actually refers to the first principles of 
knowledge without which it is not possible to inquire, know or 
judge. 
In fact Clement himself later goes on to define belief as a 
preconception: «Faith is the voluntary supposition and anticipation 
of pre-comprehension»234. Thus it could be said that this mean-
ing of pistis really expresses the notion of a concept although us-
ing Stoic and Epicurean terminology. The Stoics also considered 
sense-perceptions as the basis of all knowledge and as the first 
cause of what they too called rcpoX-f(|>ea<;. Similarly the Epicurean 
doctrine of jtp6Xr|<|>t<; accepted by Clement, is in agreement with it. 
Clement certainly found this doctrine in conformity with his own 
epistemological view of sense perception as the starting point of 
human knowledge. 
However Clement's originality is seen in the fact that after 
mentioning Epicurus' doctrine, he maintains, contrary to 
Epicurus, for whom jtpoXTjclnc. is itself knowledge; that a 
preconception is prior to knowledge, but not knowledge; as 
already indicated in Str. II.VI, 28.1 above, and is transformed into 
knowledge by instruction. This can be inferred from the following 
passage: «How can one, without a preconception of what he is 
aiming after, learn about that which is the subject of his investiga-
tion? He, again who has learned has already turned his preconcep-
tion into comprehension* 2 3 5 . In this regard belief is understood 
as a fundamental aspect of knowledge which serves and enhances 
the development of further knowledge. 
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In conclusion, therefore, pistis in Clement, employed in a 
gnoseological sense, refers to the assent to or the acceptance of the 
first, undemonstrable principles of demonstration. It thus pertains 
to whatever appears as evident to the rational faculties. Any kind 
of immediate knowledge based on spontaneous apprehension can 
therefore be said to fall within the scope of Clement's pistis, 
sometimes expressed as preconception. 
3. Pistis as the firm conviction of the human mind 
In the previous section we examined Clement's use of the 
term pistis to signify the attitude peculiar to the human mind 
when it assents to the first principles of demonstration. These are 
conceived as undemonstrable and trustworthy or evident. They 
therefore merit an unshakable conviction from the knowing 
faculty. 
In the present section we wish to consider the notion of 
pistis in Clement understood as the intellectual assent to a conclu-
sion. Pistis in this sense is considered as the firm conviction which 
the human mind possesses after reaching the knowledge of 
something by means of a scientific demonstration. Clement 
understood quite well that a characteristic aspect of scientific 
demonstration is the attainment of the truth. Consequently he 
also uses pistis to designate the firm belief of the mind in the 
truth of the conclusion of demonstration. 
One of the most outstanding passages in this regard is the 
following: «Knowledge, accordingly, is charactrerized by faith; and 
faith by a kind of divine mutual and reciprocal correspondence, 
becomes characterized by knowledge* 2 3 6. 
The essential characteristic feature of pistis, which is the firm 
conviction in the reality being considered, is evident in Clement's 
definition of scientific knowledge. Thus he says, «But that 
knowledge, which is the scientific demonstration of what is 
delivered according to the true philosophy, is founded on faith. 
Now, we may say that it is that process of reason which, from 
what is admitted, procures faith in what is disputed* 2 3 7 . 
Clement considers the end of demonstration as the causing 
of assent to what is not yet convincing. Hence Clement says, 
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«The knowledge of the truth among us from what is already 
believed, produces faith in what is not yet believed; which is, so 
to speak, the essence of demonstration* 2 3 8 . 
Such passages as we have seen above explain why Clement 
referring to Aristotle agrees with him in that the intellect natural-
ly assents to the truth. To this end he affirms that «Now Aristo-
tle says that the judgement which follows knowledge is in truth 
faith. Accordingly, therefore, faith is something superior to 
knowledge, and it is its criterion* 2 3 9 . Faith is thus considered a 
criterion of knowledge. 
For Clement this faith-knowledge becomes gnosis as can be 
seen in Str. II.II, 49.3; V.III, 18.3 and in Str. VII.X, 57.3. Clement 
therefore maintains the Aristotelian ideas that the peculiar character 
of scientific knowledge — knowledge attained through demonstra-
tion — is represented by the firm assent by the mind to the truth 
attained. Clement also refers to this as pistis. Pistis can therefore 
refer to the product of demonstration or it may also refer to im-
mediate knowledge, as when Clement says: «Pistis is the voluntary 
supposition and anticipation of pre-comprehension»2 4 0. 
As regards the acceptance of or the assent to the premises 
of demonstration, there is no doubt that according to Clement if 
these premises are true, the conclusion thus attained will be scien-
tific knowledge; if they are only probable and based on opinion 
the inference will be knowledge subject to opinion. 
There is a similarity between the distinctions which Clement 
makes between pistis and the Aristotelian distinction between 
scientific demonstration, dialectical syllogism and rhetorical 
syllogism 2 4 1. According to Aristotle scientific demonstration has 
as its point of departure premises which are first and true prin-
ciples, whereas for the latter two types of syllogisms are based on 
premises which belong to the sphere of opinion. 
For Clement, therefore, just as for Aristotle, dialectical and 
rhetorical syllogisms are based on merely probable premises; and 
Clement's pistis strictly speaking does not refer to this type of 
premises of demonstration. In fact, according to Clement, pistis is 
identified with scientific knowledge since it is its direct product as 
is expressed in some of the above passages. Since such scientific 
knowledge or gnosis is only possible if the mind has a firm con-
viction of the truth in question, Clement considers such pistis as 
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superior to spontaneous knowledge, i7tia-tcp(XTi 2 4 2. He therefore 
maintains a very close relationship between pistis, demonstration 
and scientific knowledge, clearly distinguishing them from the 
sphere of opinion. 
C. The Will and the Act of Knowledge 
According to Clement, «to will is the act of the soul, but 
to do so is not without the body. Nor are actions estimated by 
their issue alone; but they are judged also according to the ele-
ment of free choice in each» 2 4 3 . Hence he would say that what 
we do not, we do not either from, not being able, or not being 
willing or both 2 4 4 . Consequently in Clement's view, «what is 
voluntary is either what is by desire, or what is by choice, or 
what is of intention* 2 4 5 . 
Clement includes knowledge among those acts he considers 
as voluntary acts. This is in view of the fact that the desire to 
know aids in the acquisition of knowledge. This is the point to 
be examined in the next few pages. 
1. Knowledge as a Voluntary Act: a Rational Choice 
Now since knowledge is subject to the voluntary operation 
of the soul, Clement is also of the view that knowledge is a 
voluntary act. Accordingly it is either of desire, choice or inten-
tion. The role of the will is so essential in the act of knowledge, 
according to Clement, that it could be said that to know one has 
to will it. «Therefore volition takes the precedence of all; for the 
intellectual powers are ministers of the will. Will, it is said, and 
thou shalt be able.» 2 4 6 . 
In view of such attributes by Clement to the will, there 
seems to be some justification to think that in his approach to 
knowledge there is a certain tendency to intellectual voluntarism 
in Clement. However that this is not really the case would 
become clearer in the course of our discussion. 
In one of the opening paragraphs of Stromata BK. I, Cle-
ment says: «It is by one's own fault that he does not choose what 
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is best; God is free of blame» 2 4 7 . This principle of freedom of 
choice and human freedom is firmly maintained by the Christian 
view of truth which no doubt greatly influenced Clement's con-
ception of knowledge 2 4 8 . Clement affirms this fact as against the 
implicit fatalism of certain gnostics 2 4 9 . Clement, who holds in 
very high esteem man's free, will cannot but find the celebrated 
saying in Plato's Republic very appealing. «The blame is his who 
chooses; Heaven is blameless» 2 5 0. 
Clement's view of the independence of the will and its great 
autonomy leads him to attribute to the human will an extensive 
power of determining its actions 2 5 1 . This is most clearly seen 
when he is dealing with moral acts which in Clement are intimately 
linked to cognitive acts because his notion of knowledge is operative 
and leads to virtuous perfection. According to Clement, therefore, 
it would seem that our voluntary acts depend almost exclusively 
on us. Hence «to free ourselves from ignorance, and from evil and 
voluptuous choice, and above all, to withhold our assent from those 
delusive phantasies, depends on ourselves» 2 5 2 . 
Application to the training of ourselves and consequently 
the acquisition of knowledge as well as subjection to the Com-
mandments, are among the acts Clement considers under our 
power 2 5 3 . Others include distraction and disobedience as weir as 
obedience 2 5 4 . 
With this notion of the will, virtue is said to depend on 
us 2 5 5 , and the requisition of gnosis or perfect knowledge is by a 
free choice 2 5 6 . Knowledge is therefore considered to be a volun-
tary act and the love for the contemplation of the truth is the 
beginning of wisdom. Closely connected with this question of 
knowledge as a rational choice is the question of the priority of 
the will and the intellect. 
2. Priority of the Will and of the Intellect 
From what we have seen above, there is no doubt that for 
Clement the role of the will in assenting to truth is really essen-
tial in the act of knowledge. A docile disposition and great desire 
that leads to a practical application of the other faculties and 
necessary means facilitate the acquisition of the truth. In view of 
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this Clement explains that «the preference and choice of truth is 
voluntary* 2 5 7 . To this end, he repeatedly maintains that belief 
aids understanding. This is most clearly seen when Clement is 
dealing with knowledge of the Christian truth as for instance 
when he says that «intellectual apprehension depends on faith» 2 5 8 . 
Hence the conclusion: «For he who hopes, as he who believes 
sees intellectual objects and future things with the mind» 2 5 9 . 
On the other hand some passages of Clement tend to point 
to the fact that according to him the intellect has priority over 
the will. Knowledge would therefore precede desire. This is 
precisely the case with the knowledge of revealed truth as for in-
stance when Clement speaking about knowledge of the Christian 
truth declares: «He, then, who imitates opinion shows also 
preconception. When then one, having got an inkling of the sub-
ject, kindles it within his soul by desire and study, he sets 
everything in motion afterwards in order to know it. For that 
which one does not apprehend, neither does he desire it, nor does 
he embrace the advantage flowing from i t» 2 6 0 . 
It is an expressed view of Clement that the intellect and the 
will being rational faculties are principles of knowledge, desire and 
action. «For both are powers of the soul, both knowledge and im-
pulse. And impulse is found to be a movement after an assent. 
For he who has an impulse towards an action, first receives the 
knowledge of the action, and secondly the impulse* 2 6 1. 
The intellect therefore seems to have priority over the will. 
In fact Clement goes on to add that «since learning is older than 
action (for naturally, he who does what he wishes to do learns 
it first: and knowledge comes from learning, and impulse follows 
knowledge; after which comes action) knowledge turns out to be 
the beginning and author of all rational action* 2 6 2 . 
Consequently gnoseological faith is thus to be regarded as an 
intellectual desire, since it is the assent of the mind to unseen ob-
jects. These ideas are clearly used by Clement to express the rela-
tionship between belief and knowledge; will and intellect. Accor-
dingly «If then faith be choice, being desirous of something, the 
desire is in this instance intellectual. And since choice is the 
beginning of action, faith is discovered to be the beginning of ac-
tion, being the foundation of rational choice in the case of anyone 
who exhibits to himself the previous demonstration through 
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faith» 2 6 3 . This syllogism employed by Clement in the above 
passage is Aristotelican as so also is the definition of choice 2 6 4 . 
Hence Clement's affirmation that «voluntarily to follow what is 
useful is the first principle of understanding*2 6 5. First comes the 
knowledge of the object through intellectual apprehension; then 
the desire of the object thus apprehended 
In Clement's view, therefore, first comes knowledge, then 
volition and finally action. «So that rightly the peculiar nature of 
the rational soul is characterized by this alone; for in reality im-
pulse, like knowledge, is excited by existing objects* 2 6 6 , since 
knowledge is the contemplation of beings that are. 
D. Belief and Understanding 
Despite such extensive attributes to the will as we have just 
seen, Clement nevertheless is quite aware of the limitations of the 
human rational capacity. According to Clement, therefore, the 
human intellect alone cannot arrive to perfect knowledge and 
truth, nor apprehend all the knowledge it could. Consequently 
God in his divine providence has revealed some deeper truths by 
the divine Logos. Hence Clement's insistence on faith in the 
divine Logos and in His teaching, the Christian truth, in order to 
acquire a more perfect knowledge. «For there is nothing like hear-
ing the Word Himself, who by means of Scripture inspires fuller 
intelligence* 2 6 7. For him faith and trust in the divine authority 
as the ultimate measure of truth is unquestionable. This is clearly 
manifested by his theory of assent. 
Clement saw a harmonious relationship between faith and 
reason, between divine revelation and the effort of the human in-
tellect to reach the most profound truths. In fact this is one of 
Clement's main tasks. «Animated by the attitude which was later 
summed up in the formula, Credo, ut intelligam, he sought to 
develop the systematic presentation of the Christian wisdom in a 
true, as opposed to a false gnosis» 2W. 
Accordingly, in our author's view to dispense of or 
disbelieve Scriptures and Christian revelation inevitably implies 
the impossibility of attaining the whole and real truth. «But 
whoever chooses to banquet on faith, is steadfast for the reception 
1 6 6 BONIFACE N. OKAFOR 
of the divine words, having acquired already faith as a power of 
judging, according to reason*. Hence ensues to him persuasion in 
abundance. And this was the meaning of that saying of prophecy, 
«If ye believe not, neither shall ye understand* 2 6 9 . Faith is 
therefore indispensible for knowledge. 
So much is faith an essential aspect in Clement's gnoseology 
that he regards it as a way of attaining knowledge of the ultimate 
cause, righteousness and wisdom. Clement therefore affirms that 
«also Xenocrates, in his book on «Intelligence», says «that wisdom 
is the knowledge of first causes and of intellectual essences*2 7 0. 
To this end Clement does not fail to point out that «it has been 
shown that the knowledge of the first cause of the universe is of 
faith, but it is not demonstration* 2 7 1. 
Just as the voluntary acts of the will which are necessary for 
human perfection do not depend exclusively on the faculties, so 
also is knowledge not dependent exclusively o the human in-
tellect. «For neither is it possible to attain it (the perfect good) 
without the exercise of the free choice; nor does the whole de-
pend on our own purpose; as for example, what is destined to 
happen* 2 7 2 . 
In this respect Clement attributes an indispensible role to 
the help of the divine Logos in human knowledge. «For since the 
soul became too enfeebled for the apprehension of realities, we 
need a divine teacher. The Saviour is sent down —a teacher and 
leader in the acquisition of the good— the secret and sacred token 
of the great providence* 2 7 3. 
Now the act of faith is an act of the will, according to Cle-
ment, and firm and true faith augments the momentum in the 
direction of knowledge. Consequently, «the exercise of faith 
directly becomes knowledge, reposing on a sure foundation* 2 7 4, 
which is the divine authority itself. Such then is the natural 
prerogative of him who has received faith or assented to the first 
indemonstrable principles of knowledge to apprehend knowledge, 
if he desires. Thus developing a perfect knowledge on «the foun-
dation* of faith 2 7 5 . 
In conclusion therefore Clement's theory of assent manifests 
the importance he attributes to voluntary aspect of knowledge in 
general. The intellectual assent to the first indemonstrable prin-
ciples of knowlege is considered as the foundation of knowledge. 
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From the discussion so far it can be seen that Clement attributes 
a mutual relationship to the roles of the intellect and will in the 
act of knowledge. He can therefore not be really accused of in-
tellectual voluntarism. 
As can be inferred from Clement's theory of belief, he con-
siders knowledge and in particular wisdom as a whole. In this 
sense, he emphasizes the voluntary psychological presupposition 
whereby wisdom also includes possession of the virtues. He does 
not assume an analytic or scholastic perspective in which the first 
principles are objects of the will (Ockham, Descartes). Clement's 
notion of belief, as that of the ancient Greek philosophers, is not 
to be identified with the modern belief (of Hume for instance). 
Clement, as a good Greek, is very intellectualistic. He is not 
a voluntarist nor a fideist in the modern sense. He does not use 
belief in order to solve critical problems nor to refute scepticism. 
For Clement, belief means simply conviction, personal commit-
ment. It corresponds to the very common principle that one will 
not know if one does not want to know. 
In the case of the Christian truth, an essential part of Cle-
ment's notion of truth, he attributes the character of first prin-
ciples to the contents of revelation. Hence the need to assent to 
them as the foundation for further knowledge. Clement's theory 
of belief also reflects his view of the limitation of the speculative 
faculty. 
CONCLUSIONS 
As can be inferred from the foregoing study, Clement's con-
ception of knowledge comprises the apprehension of all truth be 
it natural or supernatural, speculative or practical, human or 
divine, demonstrable or based on faith. He no doubt possesses and 
proposes a comprehensive approach to knowledge. 
Clement's theory of the Logos, his Christian conception of 
human psychology as well as his theory of symbolism and his 
theory of pistis constitute essential aspects of his theory of 
knowledge. To these must be added Clement's conception of con-
templation and wisdom which reflect the intimate connection bet-
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ween intellectual and moral perfection in his concept of 
knowledge. Their fundamental role in Clement's gnoseological 
doctrine is evidenced by his exposition of the Christian gnosis. 
The latter is considered to be the knowledge of things human and 
divine. According to Clement perfect knowledge must therefore 
lead to the perfect contemplation of God, the most perfect object 
of knowledge and the ultimate goal of real wisdom. 
1. Clement's anthropological view is very much inspired in 
the Christian doctrine of the divine element in man, the spiritual 
soul. Hence the sense of the supernatural is a recurrent aspect of 
Clement's theory of knowledge. From Platonism he is influenced 
by the doctrine of the world of immaterial forms and from Chris-
tianity by the indispensable role of the divine Logos in human 
knowledge. 
A fact that stands out in Clement's theory of knowledge is 
his optimistic conception about the human capacity to attain true 
knowledge of reality. Hence his criticism of philosophical scep-
ticism. In the human acquisition of knowledge, Clement counts 
with the following sources: a common natural apprehension of 
reality, involving sense perception and intellectual abstraction; a 
natural revelation as in the case of the philosophers, and a super-
natural revelation. All these are conceived as harmonious and 
complementary towards the acquisition of the perfect knowledge 
of things human and divine. As a consequence of Clement's 
realistic and comprehensive conception of knowledge, the Logos is 
considered as a metaphysical and a gnoseological principle. Cle-
ment envisages a close affinity between the human intellect and 
the Logos, considering them as ontological principles of human 
knowledge. 
Clement's theory of knowledge is to be considered in view of 
his Christian notion of man understood as endowed with sense per-
ception and intellectual apprehension. In his view the latter proceeds 
from the former by abstraction. Although the two are indispensable 
for knowledge, only to the intellect is knowledge attributed pro-
perly speaking. Clement's anthropological stand, in view of his 
theory of knowledge, takes into account all the essential elements 
in human nature: the spiritual soul infused at creation and its ra-
tional faculties as well as the senses. The acquisition of knowledge 
is considered to result as combined roles of these faculties. 
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Although Clement does not expound a highly developed 
psychology as is later to be found in St. Thomas' works, he 
nevertheless takes the first steps in the right direction among the 
Christian thinkers. He possesses a substantially Christian an-
thropology, the Platonic influences notwithstanding. He affirms 
that the intellect is the proper faculty of knowledge and that 
although knowledge is immaterial, it nevertheless starts with sense 
perception. Hence Clement considers sense experience as one of 
the pillars of truth and the ladder to knowledge. 
It can be said that Clement's anthropological stand, in view 
of his theory of knowledge, takes into account all the essential 
elements in human nature: the soul and its rational faculties as 
well as the senses. According to Clement, therefore, knowledge is 
possible thanks to man's possession of the spirit infused at crea-
tion, the soul, the ruling faculty and the senses. Thus Clement re-
jects philosophical scepticism and the suspension of judgement as 
principles of knowledge. He admits the possibility of doubt on 
the basis of the incoherence between propositions and the reality 
apprehended by the intellect. In Clement we can already find the 
idea that the truth is the coherence between the human intellect 
and reality; an idea later to be developed by St. Thomas Aquinas. 
Nevertheless it is the limitation of the human mind that Clement 
considers to be the cause of logical sceptism, and not the nature 
of things. 
Clement attaches an indispensable role to sense perception in 
human knowledge. It provides the first data of knowledge for the 
intellect thus serving as the ladder to intellectual apprehension. All 
human knowledge starts from some sense perception and advances 
by progressive abstraction from matter but always refers to reali-
ty. Clement's realistic approach to knowledge leads him to shun 
sensism and empiricism as well as any materialist approach to 
knowledge. He does not consider the truth of sense perception as 
being absolute. 
2. Apart from abstraction, such logical acts as demonstra-
tion, definition, and dialectic proceedings are all attributed by Cle-
ment to the intellect because only with them is there real applica-
tion of the intellect. To this end Clement regards them as acts of 
the intellect that result in the acquisition of truth. Clement firmly 
agrees with the Platonic doctrine that real knowledge is of the im-
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mutable and intelligible reality. Consequently the intellect is the 
appropriate faculty for knowledge. In this regard he makes quite 
an interesting and firm criticism of Empiricism. He maintains that 
bound in this earthly body, man apprehends the sensible objects 
by means of the senses; but that he grasps intellectual objects by 
means of the logical faculty itself. Accordingly he points out that 
the object of knowledge is not only that which is subject to sense 
experience. 
In his conception of knowledge, the ethical and the 
speculative aspects are intimately linked. Hence his notion of 
abstraction from matter extends not only to the intellect but to 
the separation of the knowing subject from the passions in or-
der to acquire perfect knowledge. In this regard Clement em-
phasizes the need for separation from matter and from the pas-
sions in order to possess perfect contemplation. It seems that 
Clement's notion of abstraction is a manifestation of the general 
tendency of the Alexandrian school to see the passions in a 
gnoseological context. However he points out that the most pro-
fund contemplation starts with knowledge of created reality. He 
affrms that if one expects to apprehend all things by the senses 
alone, one has fallen far from the truth. According to him, 
although the senses contribute to the apprehension of the truth, 
not all truth is subject to sense perception. Consequently the 
human intellectual faculty can apprehend realities which are above 
the reach of the senses. 
As we can see so far, Clement maintains the classical scheme 
of knowledge whereby from sense perception, followed by abstrac-
tion, we attain intellectual apprehension. This idea is closely link-
ed to Clement's view of knowledge as contemplation and par-
ticularly so when he speaks of the knowledge of immaterial 
beings and of God. As has been seen above, according to Cle-
ment, knowledge is, properly speaking, proper of the rational 
powers and therefore characterised by judgement and reason. 
These rational powers are therefore directed to mental objects or 
concepts which have their foundation in reality. The adequate 
relationship between reality, concept and language is thus 
necessary for them to be true knowledge. Hence Clement's affir-
mation of the importance of the logical inquiry in which the ra-
tional faculties act in a reasoning process. 
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Consequently, in Clement's view, separation from the sensi-
ble things, particularly from the body, is the only way to achieve 
the contemplation of the intelligible world which is the object of 
the intellect. Thus it is to be concluded that Clement's notion of 
abstraction, although not very sofisticatedly developed, expresses 
the essential idea that the objects of the intellect are the im-
material forms of sensible realities. These forms are obtained from 
sensible things through intellectual abstraction and through them 
the intellect knows the infinity of particular things. Clement's 
operative notion of knowledge leads him to extend this idea to 
the abstraction from the passions in order to acquire perfect 
knowledge. 
3. In the gnoseological theory behind Clement's thought, the 
extramental reality is always the touchstone of man's knowledge. 
This fact, together with his positive attitude to knowledge, also 
shows that his logic is not founded on pure mental constructions. 
This becomes even more evident after discussing his concepts of 
definition and scepticism. The fact that reality is the touch stone 
of knowledge is reflected in Clement's view on the intellectual 
processes in the acquisition of knowledge. This is reflected in his 
ideas on logic in which he is strongly influenced by the 
Aristotelian doctrine of scientific demonstration and by Platonic 
dialectics. 
Clement's notion of demonstration contains the essential 
elements of the Aristotelian theory. For instance, Clement affirms 
the necessity of first undemonstrable principles, the presence of at 
least two true and different premises, logical syllogism and the 
right conclusion. In expounding how Clement articulates these 
essential elements, it has been possible to have another glimpse at 
our author's positive and realistic approach to knowledge. 
The use of Aristotelian terminology, the realistic distinction 
between the three elements of knowledge mentioned above 
(names, concepts and things) and the discussion on the ten 
categories, shows the Aristotelian inclination of Clement's logic. 
However Clement does not make a strict distinction between 
Aristotelian logic and Platonic dialectics. Rather, he attributes to 
the latter the importance Aristotle attributes to the former. It can 
be inferred that Clement strongly holds the view that for there 
to be logical truth, the terms employed must really express the 
1 7 2 BONIFACE N. OKAFOR 
reality they signify (Cfr. section above on definition). Further-
more, since names have their ultimate foundation in the reality 
they are meant to refer to, Clement points out that a logical truth 
is scientific in the measure in which it corresponds to the reality 
signified by it. 
From the foregoing, it is obvious that Clement's notion of 
demonstration contains the essential elements of the Aristotelian 
concept of demonstration. For instance, Clement affirms the 
necessity of first indemonstrable principles, the presence of at least 
two true and different premises, logical syllogism and the right 
conclusion. In expounding how Clement articulates these essential 
elements, it has been possible to have another glimpse at our 
author's positive and realistic approach to knowledge. Clement af-
firms that there is a distinction between demonstration, syllogism 
and analysis. The distinguishing characteristic being that true 
demonstration is only possible if the premises correspond to, and 
truly express, the reality of the matter in question. Otherwise, 
one is dealing with mere syl logism. Thus in Clement 's 
gnoseological theory, extramental reality is always the touchstone 
of man's knowledge. This fact, together with his positive attitude 
towards knowledge, also shows that his logic is not founded on 
pure mental constructions. This becomes even more evident after 
discussing his concepts of definition and scepticism. 
From Clement's account of definition it must be concluded 
that his account reflects a profound influence from Aristotelian 
doctrine and terminology — directly derived or otherwise. Accor-
ding to him, a definition therefore expounds the essence of a 
thing, for instance man as a rational, laughing animal. It is 
however incapable of accurately comprehending the complete 
nature of the thing. For a scientific definition it is necessary to 
divide the genus into at least two essentially necessary species for 
the sake of brevity. By means of uniting the principal species, a 
definition exposes the essence of a thing in the qualities expressed. 
Clement's dialectics is an act of the intellectual faculty that 
by discerning the true and the false ascends to the most excellent 
essence of all reality in accordance with the science of things 
human and divine which is the true gnosis. Similarly, dialectics, 
which Clement considers as a function of the intellect, is regarded 
as the logical discussion of intellectual subjects, with selection and 
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assent. This intellectual act establishes by demonstration, allega-
tions respecting truth, and demolishes the doubts brought for-
ward. Thus Clement's conception of dialectic is entirely Platonic 
and not Aristotelican although Clement's syncretism leads him to 
use Aristotelican philosophical method (logic) and Platonic dialec-
tic. Although he does not really separate logic and dialectic, he 
nevertheless highlights dialectic to a greater extent. 
4. Nevertheless, Clement is of the view that not all 
knowledge responds to logical analysis owing to the complexity of 
reality and our knowledge of it. According to him, the most 
sublime truths are not immediately apprehended by the intellect 
but through symbols. Clement sees an appropriate need for some 
use of symbolism in the understanding of revealed truth which he 
considers to contain deeper meanings. The origin of Clement's 
symbolism, derives from the influence of the mystery religions 
and that of the esoteric philosophical systems. These include 
especially Pythagorism, Platonism and Stoicism. However, the im-
mediate origin of Clement's symbolism can be attributed to his 
literary dependence on Christian Platonism, in particular Philo, 
on Scripture and the gnostic literature. Together with all these, 
Clement's syncretic method must also be taken into account. 
Clement emphasizes the esoteric nature of the most sublime 
realities and consequently of the knowledge about them, since the 
intellect is not perfect. This for Clement is the foundation of 
symbolic knowledge. The origin of his theory of symbolism can 
be traced back to the influence of the oriental mystery religions, 
the Greek mysteries, Scripture and Clement's dependence on the 
philosophical tradition of his time. 
5. For Clement, knowledge is a voluntary act, in its cause, 
compatible with being formally an intellectual act. Hence the very 
important roles he attributes to the intellect and to the will in his 
conception of knowledge. This also reflects another aspect of Cle-
ment's notion of knowledge. According to Clement, knowledge is 
operative and leads to human perfection, contributing to man's at-
tainment of his ultimate goal. Hence the intellectual, spiritual, 
logical and moral elements of knowledge are all brought into in-
timate connection in Clement's gnoseology. 
Clement's conception of the voluntary nature of knowledge 
is seen in his theory of pistis, in which he intends to develop a 
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doctrine of belief or assent to the truth. The general thesis is that 
(from the point of view of its cause) knowledge is a voluntary act 
and consequently one would not know if one does not will to 
know. Clement finds a parallelism between the nature of the Aristo-
telian notion of the undemonstrable first principles of demonstration 
and the objects of belief. To this end the first principles of dem-
onstration are to speculative knowledge what the data of revelation 
are to religious knowledge. In this regard the revealed truths are 
the first undemonstrable principles of religious knowledge. 
The basis of Clement's theory of belief is that the demonstra-
tion of scientific knowledge cannot go on ad infinitum. There must 
therefore be some starting principle which being an evident truth 
or a conclusion is the object of belief. Thus Clement applies the 
Aristotelian idea of the intellectual apprehension of the first prin-
ciples of demonstration to his doctrine of belief. To this end he 
points out that the knowledge of the first cause of the universe, 
the Creator, is not the subject of demonstration. 
6. Clement's notion of knowledge as wisdom transcends mere 
natural human wisdom or practical knowledge. His concept of 
wisdom comprises philosophical, theological and the Christian gnosis. 
Wisdom ought to lead to the possession of the eternal and un-
changeable habit of contemplation which is at the same time 
operative on to complete perfection. The idea of contemplation in 
Clement reflects unmistakable Platonic and Christian influences as 
can be inferred from his conception of the objects of contempla-
tion. For him contemplation is undoubtedly something spiritual; 
a purely intellectual act. It is an intellectual vision and speculation. 
As regards philosophical wisdom, Clement's conception of 
philosophy as a divine gnoseological instrument in history is quite 
original. His thesis is that philosophy is of divine origin and had 
been given to the Greeks as the Old Testament was given to the 
Jews to prepare them for the reception of Christian wisdom. Thus 
philosophy as well as revelation have a common origin and are 
directed to the same end. 
Clement's concept of true philosophy is unquestionably eclec-
tic. In his evaluation of Greek philosophy, he holds Plato 
and Pythagorism in high regard and condemns Stoic materialism 
and determinism. The Peripatetic doctrine which limits divine pro-
vidence is also criticized by Clement. His strongest criticisms are 
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reserved for the philosophy of Epicurus and the Sophists. Never-
theless, Clement admits that the best Greek philosophers who had 
truly philosophized, had attained some aspects of the truth. 
7. At the core of Clement's eclecticism is his view that truth 
is truth and universal wherever it may be found. Hence there is 
a harmonious relationship between true speculative knowledge and 
Christian truth. All true knowledge is a participation in the Logos 
who is Wisdom. The relationship between reason and faith is a 
crucial problem in Clement's whole thought. There is no doubt 
that the solution he provides sheds a lot of light on the theory 
of knowledge behind his thought. For Clement, there is a har-
monious relationship between reason and faith. The mutual rela-
tionship between Philosophy and Revelation is based on their 
common divine origin and goal. The relationship between them is 
therefore considered as harmonious and complementary. 
Clement's merit lies in his establishment of the fundamental 
balanced principle in the reason-faith relationship. A more pro-
found and systematic theory of the relationship between faith and 
reason will later be developed by St. Thomas. Clement is the first 
to lay down in a firm way the principle that God, being the same 
author of the natural and the supernatural, does not permit any 
contradiction nor the devaluation of the truth attained by the in-
tellect. Nevertheless, the revealed truth is superior. In Clement we 
can already find the germ of an essential aspect of Christian 
philosophy. Hence he has been considered the precursor of Chris-
tian philosophy, later to be developed by St. Augustine and St. 
Thomas Aquinas. 
Finally it is worthwhile mentioning at this point that all 
these elements present in Clement's thought already contain 
substantially complete the gnoseological doctrine later to be receiv-
ed by the mediaeval Christian culture. These include Aristotelian 
epistemological elements, aspects of the Platonic doctrine of on-
tological knowledge and the importance of symbolism that later 
exercises a great influence in speculative theology. In a word it 
could be said that in Clement the Agustinian and Thomistic pro-
gramme is already marked out. Clement is truly the first in Chris-
tian philosophical thought. 
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19. Str. VI.XVI. 133.1 
20. Str. VI.XVI, 134.2 
21. Str. VI.XVI, 134.3 
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sidered as a legitimate and valid way of obtaining knowledge*. (Ibid. p. 120) 
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48. Str. VI.XVI, 135.1 
49. Str. VI.XVI, 137.1 
50. Str. VI.XVI, 136.5 
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92. Cfr. Str. VIII.VIII, 23ff. 
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categories. Cfr. Osborn, op. cit. p. 151. See note n. 5 
94. Some authors are of the view that the Eighth Book of the Stromata, is not 
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98. Str. VIII.VIII, (p.564 of the English translation used) 
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101. Osborn, op. cit. p.150 
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104. Str. VIII.III (p.559b) 
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113. Cfr. Ibid. 
114. Ibid. 
115. Str. 
116. Str. VIII.II (p.559a) 
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note 3. Cfr. Plat. Polit. 287a: ma Clem. tralascia il termine lovgu» «con la 
ragione umana» e così cristianizza la dialettica Platonica che diviene, da 
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166. Str. VI.XI, 90.4 
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182 BONIFACE N. OKAFOR 
Plato, Theaetetus 206d; Timaeus 46.a ff. as well as The Republic, 514.a ff. 
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develop their pistis into a higher form of knowledge. (Cfr. Str. I.LX, 43.1). 
These are obviously the same Christians who are opposed to the study of 
Greek philosophy. 
214. Cfr. Str. VIH.III, 7.6 and 8.1 
215. Str. VII.XVI, 95.5-6 
215. Str. Vmill, 6.7-7.2 
217. Cfr. Str. VII.XVI, 95.6 
218. Cfr. Str. Il.rV, 13.4; Str. VII. XVI, 95.6 and VIH.III, 7.3-4. Similarly, Aristo-
tle, Eth. Nic. VI.3.1140b31-1141a3; Prior An. II.16.64b32-36 and Post. an. 
I.2.71b20-23; 72a7-8. Also Cfr. Lilla, op. cit. pp.120-126). 
219. Str. II.IV, 14.1-2. Thus for Clement the authority of the Logos surpasses the 
rational demonstration (cfr. Str. V.I, 5.4; and Str. VII.XVI, 93.2 ff.) and this 
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is the unity between the faith and human knowledge of things natural and 
supernatural. The idea of what is known before is an Aristotelican concept 
that appears in Post. an. I.2.71b21; Metaphysics. 1.9. 992b 30; Ethic. Nic. 
VI.3.1139b25-27. 
220. It must be mentioned that Lilla has given some attention to the sources 
of Clement's doctrine of Pistis. According to him and in agreement with 
I. von Armin, De Octavo dementis Stromateorum libro (Rostock Progr., 
1894) p. 12 and with Ernst, W. De dementis Alexandrini Stromatum libro 
octavo qui fertur (Diss. Grottingen, 1910), the underlying ideas of Clement's 
doctrine of the Pistis and the material on logic in Str. BK. VIII are mainly 
based on notes taken by Clement himself during his reading of some hand-
books of logic. 
221. Cfr. Prior an. 64b32-6, Post. an. 71b20-3, 72a7-8, 84a30-3 as well as in Eth. 
Nic. 1140b31-3. 
222. Cfr. Str. VIILIII, 7.3-4. 
223. Str. II.II, 9.5. Cfr. Str. II.IV, 13.4-14.1; VII.XVI, 95.6 and in VIILIII, 6.7-7.2; 
Also cfr. Rep. VI.511b for similar ideas. 
224. Str. II.IV, 13.2 
225. Attention has been drawn by Lilla to Clement's possible dependence on a 
work by Theophrastus or a Peripatetic school-handbook and on Antiochus 
of Ascalon through the Adversus Mathematicos, VII.226 and 218. Cfr. Str. 
II.II, 9.5; and Str. II.IV, 13.2; and VIILIII, 14.3, respectively. 
226. Str. II.IV, 13.3 
227. On the dependence of the passages of Str. II.IV, 13.2 and VIILIII, 7.3-4 on 
Antiochus, also cfr. R.E. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism, 
Cambridge, 1937, p. 34. 
228. Cfr. Lilla, op. cit. p.131-2 where attention has been drawn to these close 
correspondences between Antiochus, Philo and Clement (ibid, footnote n. 2.) 
229. Str. II.II, 8.4. For the definition of faith as assent Cfr. Str. II.II, 4.1; 9.1; 
III, 11; VI, 27-28; V.I, 3.2; V.XIII, 86.1 and VILLI, 8.1. 
230. Str. ILXII, 54.5-55.1. Clement is very much of the idea that the freedom 
of assent is in man's power. Cfr. Str. I.I, 4.1 where he speaks of the volun-
tariness of faith. Also see Str. V.I, 3.2 and III, 11.1-2. 
231. Cfr. Lilla, op. cit. 127-9 
232. Cfr. Str. II.IV, 16.3 On the Stoic doctrine of assent, Cfr. R.E. Witt, Albinus 
and the History of Middle-Platonism, Cambridge 1937, pp. 29-34, 50. Witt 
has shown Antiochus' adoption of this Stoic doctrine of assent and connec-
ting it with pistis. 
233. Str. II.II, 16.3. This is one of Clement's few positive references to the 
atheistic Epicurus, whom he nevertheless does not miss the opportunity to 
criticize in this passage (Cfr. Str. I.I, 1.2; I.XI, 50.6). On more about 
preconception see Str. II.II, 8.4 and Str. II.VI, 28.1. 
234. Str. II.VI, 28.1. 
235. Str. II.IV, 17.1 
236. Str. II.IV, 16.2 
237. Str. II.XI, 48.1. Cfr. Str. VIILIII, 5.1-3 and 7.6. There is a Stoic influence 
in this definition of demonstration as has been rightly noted by Witt, op. 
cit. p. 33. See footnotes 5 and 7. 
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238. Str. VII.XVI, 98.3. 
239. Str. II.IV, 15.5. Cfr. R. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle-Platonism, 
Cambridge 1957, p. 31; E. Osborn, The Philosohy of Clement of Alexandria, 
Cambridge 1954, p. 132. Cfr. Anal. Pr. II.23.68bl2 etc. and Str. VII.X, 55. 
240. Str. II.VI, 28.1. 
241. Cfr. Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 7 1 b l 8 ; Topics 100a27-30, and Posterior 
Analytics, 46a9-10. 
242. Cfr. Str. II.IV, 15.5. 
243. Str. II.VI, 26.4-5 
244. Cfr. Str. II.XVII, 77.2 
245. Str. II.XV, 62.1 
246. Str. II.XVII, 77.4. Cfr. Str. I.I, 1.1; V.XI, 71.5 and VII.X, 55.3. 
247. Str. I.I, 4.1 
248. Cfr. Str. I.XVII, 83.5-84.2; Str. II.XIV where Clement speaks about involun-
tary acts and Str. II.XV, where he deals with voluntarty acts. 
249. Cfr. Str. II.III; XX.115-116. 
250. Plato, Republic X 617 e. Cfr. II 379b, c. Tim. 42d; Laws. X 904c. cfr. Str. 
II.XVI,75.2-3; IV.XXIII, 150.4; V.XIV.136.4; VII.IL12.1. This idea is similary 
to be found in Paed. 1.8, 69.1 
251. Cfr. Str. III.VII, 58.1; IX,65.1 for allusions to the independence of the will. 
252. Str. I.XVII, 84.5 
253. cfr. Str. II.XV,62.4, cfrStr. II.VI,26.3 
254. cfr. Str. 11X111,59.6 
255. Cfr. Str. IV.XIX,124.1-2, VI.XI.95.5 
256. cfr. Str. VI.IX,78.4; VH.XVL101.6 
257. Str. I.XVIII, 89.1 
258. Str. VI.XVIII, 151.5 
259. Str. V.III, 16.1 
260. Str. VI.XVII, 150.1-2 
261. Str. VI.VIII, 68.3-69.1 It is interesting to note Clement's use of the Stoic 
definition of impulse in this passage. Cfr. Chrysippus., fr. moe 462 A m . 
Also cfr. Str. II.XIII, 59.6 and Str. I.I, 4.1 for references to interior free 
will. 
262. Ibid., 69.2 
263. Str. II.II, 9.2 
264. Cfr. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. VI 2, 4 1139 a 31, b 4 
265. Str. II.II, 9.3 
266. Str. VI.VIII, 69.3 
267. Str. V V , 40.1 
268. F. Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy Vol. II. Mediaeval Philosophy 
Augustine to Scotus, Newman, Westminster, Maryland, 1952, p. 26 
269. Str. II.II, 8.2. 
270. Str. II.V, 24.1 
271. Str. II.V, 24.2. Cfr. II.IV, 13.4-14.3 for Clement's demonstration that the 
science of the first principle of the universe is reducible to faith and not 
to demonstration. 
272. Str. V . l , 7.1. This same idea is applied to salvation since according to him 
our salvation depends on our free will but not without divine gift. To this 
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end Clement refers to Eph. 2.5: «For by grace we are saved», pointing out 
that, «not, indeed, without good works». 
273. Str. V.I, 7.8 
274. Str. II.II, 9.4 
275. Cfr. Str. VI.XVII, 152.1. Cfr. Str. V.IV, 26.3 
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